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

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THE EXPOSITORY TIMES

Notes of Recent Exposition

JOHN KNOX has long been a *nomen praeclarum* with us, at any rate in Presbyterian Scotland. But in the United States of America they have unearthed another one whose theological attainments make one wonder whether Shakespeare, after all, did not err in saying that a name did not matter. The American John KNOX is Professor of New Testament in Union Theological Seminary, New York; and the work of his distinguished pen ought to be better known than it is on this side of the Atlantic. If those horrid things, labels, are to be attached, Professor KNOX is, we should say, a Liberal; but he is an uncommonly fine one who has something to say and (unlike some of the post-Liberals) can say it with exhilarating clarity and grace.

As it happened, there arrived the same day on our desk two volumes with which John KNOX has had a great deal to do—one, the third instalment of a monumental Commentary on the Bible of which Dr. KNOX is the New Testament editor; the other a slim volume from the Professor's own pen. We think our readers, for their own spiritual good, should know something about both.

Let us take the larger work first. It bears the title of *The Interpreter's Bible*, and is a Commentary with a difference. At the time of writing the publishers [1] have produced three volumes of the twelve contemplated. Both the Authorised Version and the Revised Standard Version are printed at the top of the page. Volumes vii. and viii., which appeared some months ago, contain the New Testament general articles and the commentaries on the four Gospels. Volume i., just out, contains twenty-two articles on the Bible generally and on the Old Testament, and follows them with commentaries on Genesis and Exodus. Cold print can hardly convey a proper impression of the magnificence of their format, the slate-blue glory of the binding, and the superb quality of the print.

No less than one hundred and twenty-four scholars have been impressed as contributors to the new Commentary. Understandably enough, the majority of this vast team are Americans of various denominations (for Biblical scholars co-operate ecumenically better than ecclesiastics); but the list includes nineteen British scholars, excluding exiled Scots like E. F. Scott, J. T. Cleland, G. B. Caird, and the late Dr. Sclater. With satisfaction we note that three of the major essays have been assigned to very competent British hands. Herbert Farmer discusses the authority of the Bible, R. H. Strachan expounds the Gospel in the New Testament, and Vincent Taylor contributes the life of Jesus.

We said it was a Commentary with a difference. So it is. Ministers, in search of sermons, often complain that, when they are in homiletic throes, the appeal to the commentators brings them little help. *The Interpreter's Bible* deliberately sets out to remedy this defect. For every book of the Bible two very different men have been chosen: one, a technical scholar of repute, to furnish the exegesis of the Biblical text; the other, an experienced preacher, to expound and apply the 'exegeted' text to our present needs, and to supply it with 'illustrations' and 'modern instances.' To take only one example from Volume viii.: the chosen exegete of the Fourth Gospel is the late W. F. Howard of Birmingham, the well-known Johannine authority; the selected expositor is the distinguished Scottish divine and preacher, A. J. Gossip. Need we say that both have done their work well? (We lent the volume to a hard-pressed ministerial neighbour of ours, and were delighted to learn that he had found it so full of suggestion that he was reluctant to hand it back.)

Having written thus enthusiastically of the new Commentary (and it well deserves the praises bestowed on it by American reviewers), we feel bound to warn our British readers that there is for them a 'snag,' and a very serious one. American ministers, who are much better rewarded materially than their British counterparts, are probably able to afford the dollars needed for the Commentary, but in terms of our currency

[1] Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Nashville.

each volume works out at £3 10s., which means that the cost of the complete set of twelve volumes will be well over £40. In these economically straitened times few ministers in this island will be able to rise to that sum.

We have left ourselves only a little space to notice the other book. It is called *Criticism and Faith* [1] and was written after and in the light of the experience Dr. KNOX had gained in helping to edit the bigger work. It faces the question, What bearing does the historical method of studying the Bible have upon Christian faith? Many fear that the only result of such criticism must be the impairing and imperilling of their faith. Dr. KNOX bids them cast away their doubts and be of good cheer. No crucial issue hangs upon the Biblical historian's work as we have sometimes feared. The central thing in the Bible, the Christ Event, cannot be impugned by any documentary criticism, however radical. 'Christ, borne witness to by the gospels, is not confined within them, nor is he borne witness to by them alone. He is the living reality at the centre of the Church's life. No historical study of the Bible can place that reality in jeopardy.' This is the thesis wrought out in six challenging chapters. We may (says Dr. KNOX) have doubts about this or that matter in the Gospels. We may never be quite certain whether Jesus was born in Bethlehem or in Nazareth, or which form of the Beatitudes (the Matthæan or the Lucan) represents what He really said. But such questions do not affect the central verity, attested to us by the Holy Spirit in the continuing life of the Church, that God was in Christ for us men and for our salvation. Therefore, instead of distrusting criticism, we should rather welcome it, for properly used it can only enrich our faith. 'The preacher and the critic, the preacher of the gospel and the critic of the Gospels—they belong together, and they need each other. . . . For both are devoted to the recovery and interpretation of the event of which the Gospels (and indeed the entire New Testament) are the earliest record and the gospel is the continuing proclamation.'

Dr. Nels F. S. FERRÉ is Professor of Philosophical Religion in Vanderbilt University, Nashville, U.S.A., and attention has been already directed in these columns to the contribution he is making to the development of our Christian thought in the modern world. There have been already published by him three large volumes under the general heading of 'Reason and the Christian Faith.' While they do not make easy reading they establish him as a thinker of repute, thoroughly independent in spirit, and not afraid to express himself with a typical American directness. 'Economics is always applied theology.' 'Marxism may be God's means to Christian fulfilment in history.' Such statements are typical of his forthright approach. He has followed up his trilogy on 'Reason and the Christian Faith' by another volume, now published in America, 'The Christian Understanding of God,' in which he grapples still more closely with central themes, and displays a certain eagerness and excitement that carry the reader along, and communicate themselves to him at the same time.

Last year Dr. FERRÉ was lecturing at Mansfield College, Oxford, and there is now published, *Return to Christianity*,[2] a small volume which serves as an introduction to his thought for those who are meeting him for the first time. It is commended in a Foreword by Principal Nathaniel Micklem, who declares that it would be an absurdity and impertinence for him to do so were it not for the fact that the work of Dr. FERRÉ is not yet so well known in Great Britain as it ought to be. 'Dr. FERRÉ offers a radical Christian approach to the perplexities of our time.'

There are always some, securely entrenched in the British religious tradition, who are apt to ignore American thought, complacently imagining that transatlantic thinkers are only beginning to catch up. If any such still survive—and it is difficult to see how they can—contact with FERRÉ should help to stir them broad awake. So many of our leading theologians are careful and cautious, so cautious that only in their class-rooms do they express themselves at all, so careful lest their published work fall below the highest academic standards, that most of us find it bracing to be swept along by the prophet who is perhaps even struggling to express himself in coherent fashion. What if he be impulsive and even brash? Was it not Barth himself who declared that when he was groping around to find the bell-rope he suddenly discovered that he had rung the bell?

At any rate, Nels FERRÉ is not afraid to let himself go. It was Charles Morgan who declared that to the Four Freedoms there should be added a Fifth—Freedom from Interruption. We might add that for all theologians and philosophers there should be a Sixth—Freedom from Intimidation. In this age we cannot afford to be intimidated by any of the great names or the great systems of the past. We must honour them as they deserve to be

[1] Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Nashville; $1.75.

[2] S.C.M.; 5s. net.

honoured, but our laureation of them is not complete unless we are prepared in our turn to pioneer a new way. FERRÉ challenges us straight away. It is not only science that has failed us, but 'Christianity' also, both traditional and modernist. (The putting of 'Christianity' in inverted commas is deliberate.) A plague on *all* your houses—that might be his jumping off ground. And what he is searching for is what he calls radical Christianity, and he seeks for it with a true evangelical passion.

This small book of ninety-two pages has four chapters. These are 'Christianity and Truth,' 'Christianity and the Individual,' 'Christianity and the Church,' 'Christianity and Society.' This sounds pedestrian enough. We read about this in one volume after another, year after year. There will be special starry crowns for those who have not ruined the eyesight of their fellows by themselves writing after this architectural fashion. But of course it all depends upon how it is done. Why does one architect construct with genius and imagination and another fail to avoid ugliness, designing to the same specification? FERRÉ begins his first chapter by pointing out how science has failed. 'Science has nothing to say directly about the ultimate nature of reality.' 'It only describes the physical-historical world. This has long been clear to many, but now scientists and educators in increasing numbers are beginning to share this basic understanding.' 'Never have men had the chance to see so clearly that *apart from moral purpose* reason can be prostituted for the lowest ends.'

But 'Christianity' has failed also. Both the traditionalist and the modernist have been found lacking. Perhaps FERRÉ is a trifle severe on the exponents of traditional theology. He finds them holding their belief in the 'Ptolemaic God of human history.' He finds them displaying 'a spirit of obscurantism and literalism against the best men of science who loved to suffer for the truth, a spirit which even to this day fights against rather than for the facts when they challenge the miniature dimensions of its Lilliputian theology.' He finds 'every ingenious kind of rationalization to defend dogmas which ought to have been buried to release in new growth the dried kernel of life.' There follows a very just appraisal of the traditional theology, pointing out the good as well as the bad, with some sweeping condemnations of the Church's sanctioning of 'almost every form of social evil' in the name of this traditional theology. It has upheld race oppression in the name of social order, defended *laissez-faire* capitalism in the name of religious freedom, withstood science and education, and in general it has been found to abet 'all kinds of reactionism.' 'Mostly by God's good grace, as we now see, "Christianity" as the opium of the people was swept out of Russia; but even in America during the mixed struggle of World War II, historic church bells were being melted down for ammunition—calling in question, at least, the extent to which these bells have ever been summoning men to the God of Jesus Christ.'

If this applies more to America than to Britain, we may at least take some share of the blame, and these passages are quoted to point out that Dr. Micklem is right when he suggests that FERRÉ should be read. The forthrightness of his challenge and his emphasis on the necessity of a return to 'radical' Christianity cannot but do us all a great deal of good.

Books on the Person of Christ

The Kenosis Doctrine in H. R. Mackintosh's 'The Person of Jesus Christ'

By Principal Philip S. Watson, M.A., B.D., Handsworth College, Birmingham

The Kenosis Doctrine, or the Kenotic theory of the Incarnation, was first propounded in Germany in the early part of the nineteenth century. It was developed, with individual variations, by a considerable number of both Lutheran and Reformed theologians. The fullest and most systematic account of it was given by G. Thomasius of Erlangen in his *Christi Person und Werk* [1853 ff.], and the most important stage in its further development was marked by W. F. Gess's book of the same title seventeen years later. It was first made widely known in Great Britain through A. B. Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ* [1876], and by translations of works by H. Martensen and F. Godet. During the twenty or twenty-five years preceding the publication of Mackintosh's book [1912], the theory was adopted —with various modifications—by not a few distinguished British theologians. Outstanding among them were A. M. Fairbairn, Charles Gore, P. T. Forsyth, and Mackintosh himself, who in the third main section of his book develops his own version of the doctrine, showing himself incidentally in very close sympathy with Forsyth.

The name of the doctrine derives, of course, from the well-known statement of St. Paul, that Christ 'being in the form of God . . . emptied himself (*heauton ekenosen*), taking the form of a servant . . .' (Ph $2^{6f.}$). But the doctrine itself, as Mackintosh rightly insists, does not depend upon a particular exegesis of this or any other Pauline passage. All the Kenotic theologians, he says, 'proceed upon orthodox assumptions as to the Trinity and the two natures present in the one person of our Lord. Their object is to show how the Second Person of the Trinity could so enter into human life as that there resulted the genuinely human experience which is described by the evangelists.' The solution of this problem is found in the idea that 'the eternal Logos by a wonderful suspension or restriction of His Divine activities reduced Himself within the limits and conditions of manhood. Somehow He laid aside His Divine mode of existence in order to become man.' In this conception we have the essence of the Kenosis Doctrine, upon which all its representatives are agreed, however they may differ in points of detail as they expound it.

By comparison with traditional thought about the Person of Christ, the Kenotic theory is, as Mackintosh admits, 'a novel and remarkable type of Christological doctrine.' It cannot claim to be a logical consequence of Patristic teaching, although there may be occasional hints in such writers as Ignatius, Irenaeus and Hilary, which point in a similar direction. For even when the Fathers speak most movingly of the wondrous condescension of the Logos to our human estate, their conviction of the immutability and impassibility of His Divine nature is too strong to allow the *kenosis* to mean much more than a *krypsis*, a mere concealment or veiling of His Divine activities. Still less can the Kenosis Doctrine claim to be in harmony with orthodox Lutheran or Reformed Christology, although it may well have appeared to its first exponents as a means of overcoming a major difference between the two Confessions at a time when an ecclesiastical union between them was projected.

Neither Lutheran nor Reformed orthodoxy could admit that the Logos in becoming incarnate surrendered anything of His Divine glory and majesty. The Lutheran view was that He imparted—by the *communicatio idiomatum*—His own Divine attributes to His human nature, in such a way that even the baby Jesus could be said (though in a concealed manner) to rule the world. Hence the 'self-emptying' of Ph 2^{7} had reference, not to the pre-existent, but to the incarnate Logos; and it meant simply that He refrained from making any habitual use (or else made only a secret use) of the Divine qualities communicated to His humanity by its union with the divinity. This was necessary if He was to undergo such specifically human experiences as being tempted, suffering, and dying. Only occasionally could He allow His real powers to be glimpsed. The Reformed Christology, on the

other hand, rejected the idea of a *communicatio idiomatum*, maintaining that while the Divine and the human nature were truly united in Christ (in whom the Logos constituted the centre of personality), yet each nature retained its own attributes unchanged. The 'self-emptying' of Ph 2 was then referred to the pre-existent Logos; and it was held to be necessarily involved in His Incarnation, since finite human nature could not contain the infinitude of the Divine. Nevertheless, in becoming incarnate the Logos did not cease from His pre-incarnate activities, but continued to rule the world from a centre of consciousness, so to speak, 'outside the flesh.' He was said, indeed, to be at once *totus in carne* and *totus extra carnem*, wholly in the flesh and wholly outside it.

The weaknesses of these two Christologies are apparent, and it is not surprising that the Calvinists accused the Lutherans of Monophysitism or Docetism, while the Lutherans accused the Calvinists of Nestorianism. The Lutheran view scarcely allows the humanity of Christ to be genuinely human, except when it is virtually disengaged from the divinity in order to do specifically human things—an idea which imperils the unity of Christ's Person. The Reformed view, which certainly does far more justice to the humanity of our Lord, is much more obviously in danger of failing to secure the unity of His Person, and perhaps of failing to secure any real incarnation at all.

By the Kenosis Doctrine these charges and counter-charges are avoided. In its classic form as expounded by Thomasius, it agrees with the Reformed interpretation of Ph 2^7—that the *kenosis* has reference to the pre-incarnate Christ—and with the Lutheran insistence that there is no presence or activity of the incarnate Son outside of His human nature. Thomasius does not reject the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*, but extends it in such a way as to produce almost an opposite result by it; for he argues that the attributes of Christ's human nature must be transferred to His divinity, which is thereby subjected to certain limits. Hence we must say that in becoming incarnate the Logos 'renounced the fullness of His Divine being in all those relations in which He reveals Himself *ad extra*'; that He exchanged His Divine consciousness for a Divine-human, voluntarily contracting His life to the dimensions of human existence and preserving His Divine powers only in so far as was necessary to His redeeming work. As Thomasius sees it, this means that the incarnate Logos retained what he calls the 'essential' or 'immanent' attributes of Godhead, and renounced the 'relative' attributes (so-called because they have to do with His relation to the world). The former, which are truth, holiness, and love, belong to the essence of deity; the latter, which are omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence, do not. Only the essential attributes were incarnate in Christ; the others were laid aside until the close of His earthly career.

A more extreme form of this theory is presented by Gess (followed by Godet), who extends the *kenosis* to include the immanent attributes also. According to him, the Logos reduced Himself to 'the germ of a human soul,' suffered the extinction of His eternal self-consciousness, and regained it after many months as a human, variable consciousness. Only slowly, step by step, did He come to know who He really was. According to Godet, it was at His baptism that Christ's filial consciousness was re-awakened; but His filial state—the 'form of God' of which He had 'emptied Himself'—was not regained till His Ascension.

The value of the Kenotic theory, as Mackintosh sees it, is not merely that it gives full recognition to the reality and integrity of our Lord's manhood. It does that, of course, and a great part of its appeal during the last hundred years has lain in the fact that it escapes the taint of Docetism which infected so much of earlier Christology, and enables justice to be done to the historic Life portrayed in the Gospels. But what is more, Kenoticism takes far more seriously than most traditional Christology 'the wondrous nature and subduing magnitude of the Divine sacrifice' involved in the Incarnation. It gives real meaning to the assertion that Christ, though He was rich, yet for our sake became poor (2 Co 8^9); for it maintains that He did not remain all that He was in His pre-existent glory, but 'stooped down by a real surrender and self-impoverishment, and took a lower place'—thus showing 'the lengths to which Divine love will go for man's redemption.' This sense of Divine sacrifice, Mackintosh believes, is 'the profoundest motive operating in the Kenotic theories.'

Kenoticism is therefore a conception of immense *religious* significance, which in Mackintosh's view marks a considerable advance on the metaphysics of Chalcedonian Christology. The two-nature doctrine of Chalcedon, he holds, must either mean that there are two personalities in Christ, or else the Divine nature alone can be regarded as personal. But the idea of a double personality both conflicts with 'the self-consciousness of Jesus as depicted by the evangelists' and is in any case a plain impossibility, and the conception of an impersonal manhood, although it is the traditional device for securing the unity of Christ's Person, is in fact a pure abstraction.

In neither case can it be said that there is a real incarnation. These pitfalls are avoided, however, by the Kenosis Doctrine, which recognizes that the Divine elements in Christ's character are ethical and spiritual rather than metaphysical. For although there will always be metaphysic in Christology, it must be 'a metaphysic of the conscience, in which not substance but Holy Love is supreme.' 'Holy Love,' Mackintosh asserts, 'is the last criterion of reality.'

Nevertheless, the earlier forms of the Kenotic theory are open to criticism. Thomasius's distinction between the 'relative' and the 'essential' attributes of God—or the 'metaphysical' and 'ethical' attributes, as they are more commonly called—cannot be maintained. God ceases to be God, Mackintosh holds, just as surely when He renounces attributes like omnipotence and omnipresence, as when He renounces (according to Gess's theory) His Divine self-consciousness; and if what we then have in Christ is more than a mere man, it is certainly not God incarnate. The earlier Kenoticists, moreover, claim to know too much about what was involved in His becoming incarnate. Gess, for instance, asserts that during His earthly life the cosmic functions of the Son, and even the eternal generation of the Son by the Father, were temporarily suspended; while Godet maintains that the cosmic functions were taken over by the Father. But the experience of becoming incarnate, and therefore the knowledge of all it involved, was Christ's, not ours. Hence we have 'no possibility of forming a precise scientific conception of what took place'; for we 'cannot know with final intimacy any experience through which we have not passed.' We ought therefore to beware of speculative extravagances in our thinking about the Person of our Lord.

This last warning had already been heeded by many of the later Kenoticists, who found in the Kenosis Doctrine rather the key with which to unlock the problems of Christ's historic existence than an explanation of the manner in which His incarnation took place. Their starting-point, that is to say, was less with theoretical notions of divinity and humanity and the possibilities of each, than with the known facts of Christ's human life—the acknowledged facts of the New Testament. And anyone who starts with those, according to Mackintosh, will inevitably be led to some form of Kenoticism. For, he maintains, in the fully Christian view of Jesus there are four elements which cannot otherwise be held together, namely, (1) that Christ is now Divine, as being the object of faith and worship; (2) that His Divinity is in some personal sense eternal, not acquired; (3) that His earthly life was unequivocally human—He was a Jew of the first century; (4) that we cannot predicate of Him two consciousnesses or two wills. Hence we must either say that He 'carried eternal deity unmodified into the sphere of time—which is unhistoric,' or else that 'a *real* surrender of the glory and prerogatives of deity must have preceded the advent of God in Christ'—which is *kenosis*.

Now although Mackintosh speaks of a surrender of Divine glory, yet in his own theory of the *kenosis* there is no renunciation of any of the Divine attributes whatsoever. Instead, there is a 'transposition' of them, which is interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian conception of *dynamis* and *energeia*, 'potentiality' and 'actuality.' Before the Incarnation, we are to suppose, the Logos was *actually* omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient, but during His incarnate life He was only *potentially* so. The actuality of His Divine attributes was reduced to a potentiality which enabled Him to live 'wholly within the bounds of manhood.' His whole life and work, however, from the Nativity to the Ascension, was a progressive unfolding of His inherent powers; His humiliation led to His exaltation, His *kenosis* to a *plerosis*, in which the glory He had resigned was resumed. The self-limitation led to the self-fulfilment of God in Christ.

The possibility of such a Divine self-limitation is maintained by an appeal to the principle of Holy Love as 'the last criterion of reality.' If it is said, for instance, to be excluded by the fact of Divine immutability, Mackintosh replies: 'the only immutable thing in God is His Holy Love, which is His essence'; and what Christ reveals in God is 'the infinite mobility of absolute grace.' God, in other words, is immutable in character, but mutable in action; otherwise, in a world of changing moral agents, He would be morally capricious. Similarly, God's omnipotence must be interpreted in terms of love. God is almighty in the sense that He can do whatever in His love He may will to do; and He may will, for us men and our salvation, to 'limit His almightiness, translating it into terms compatible with our experience.' Hence in Jesus we see 'a derived power over the souls of men, as over Nature,' which is 'not omnipotence *simpliciter*, but such power within human limits as we feel is akin to almightiness.'

Turning to omnipresence and omniscience, Mackintosh rightly says that the former must not be taken to mean that God is physically ubiquitous, like an all-pervasive ether. It means that He is absolutely superior to, and independent of, space, time, and distance, and yet can have positive relations to them. This attribute is represented in Christ by His 'capacity to

accomplish in Palestine a universally and eternally valid work.' As part of history His work has a place and date, yet its power far transcends them. With regard to omniscience, Mackintosh says that in its eternal form it is 'an intuitive and synchronous knowledge of all things,' but that when the Eternal passes into time, 'knowledge for Him must take on a discursive and progressive character.' In this connexion a number of analogies (mainly borrowed from Forsyth) are used to show that a limitation of knowledge is possible without any alteration of personal identity. Just as, for instance, a man may know all mathematics to be potentially within his grasp, though he has mastered only as much as he needs for his calling, so Christ took only what was necessary for His vocation. He shared the ignorance and knowledge of His contemporaries, yet in His unique knowledge of God He possessed a 'spiritual omniscience' in relation to which all else is subordinate detail.

According to D. M. Baillie (*God Was In Christ*, 96), Mackintosh's theory implies 'that He who before the Incarnation had been a Divine Being now turned into a man, with human instead of Divine attributes, for the time.' But this is scarcely just, unless we are to hold that any and every man is capable of becoming aware of himself as the Second Person of the Trinity, or that all men are 'potentially' omnipotent, omnipresent and so forth. The question can, however, be raised whether Christ, although not a 'mere man,' is truly God. For He does not 'actually' possess the attributes of God—unless perhaps their reduction to 'potentiality' is but another form of the old theory of *krypsis*? If, however, the reduction was real, another question arises upon which Baillie rightly insists—namely: What was happening to the rest of the universe while the eternal Logos was confined within the bounds of a single human life? Were the cosmic functions of the creative Word in temporary abeyance? On this subject Mackintosh refuses to speculate, preferring a 'wise agnosticism,' though he reminds us of the Augustinian principle that 'the operations of the Trinity *ad extra* are indivisible,' and warns us against separating the Persons of the Godhead. But has he not himself failed to heed this warning in his treatment of the Second Person?

Another point at which Mackintosh refuses to speculate, concerns the relations between the Divinity and the humanity in Christ. He develops no psychological theory as to 'how two streams of consciousness or will co-existed or mingled in the same personality.' For one thing, he says, it has never been proved that there *are* two streams; and in any case, ethical interpretation of motive and meaning is more important than any psychological theory of method. That is no doubt very true, but Mackintosh's Kenotic theory as a whole contains much more than ethical interpretation. It replaces the Chalcedonian metaphysic of substance, not simply with the metaphysic of conscience to which Mackintosh refers, but with what might be called a metaphysic of consciousness; and it undoubtedly purports to show by what means the Incarnation was made possible, even though it does not explain precisely how it took place.

Curiously enough, in discussing the possibility of the Incarnation, the Kenoticists appear to have difficulty only with the metaphysical attributes of God. The ethical attributes—and for Mackintosh even the 'essence' of God (which is Holy Love)—can be accommodated fairly easily, it seems, within the bounds of a human life. Is this because we human beings are much more conscious of our physical than our moral limitations? Be that as it may, the assumption is that Divine omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience must either be surrendered or transposed to make incarnation possible. Indeed, Mackintosh has a double transposition, at least as regards omnipotence. First he says that almightiness must be qualified by love, and understood as the power to do whatever Holy Love may will to do; then that God willed to 'limit His almightiness' by reducing it from actuality to potentiality in order to become incarnate. This second transposition, which is of the essence of Mackintosh's Kenotic theory, is clearly both unnecessary and misleading. For God in becoming incarnate does not limit, but exercises, His power to do whatever Holy Love may will to do. Mackintosh himself at times almost makes this point. He says we must let Holy Love be infinite—unlimited—in its resource, we must not prescribe what God can or cannot do; and he suggests that only the perfectly holy may be 'free to transcend self and live in other lives,' since the sinful are too immured in self to be able to pass into other forms of experience. But in that case, why talk of limitation, reduction, transposition?

The Incarnation is not a limitation, but a demonstration, of Divine infinitude. It might rather be called an actualization of pre-existent potentiality than a reduction of pre-existent actuality. If God could not become incarnate, clearly His power would be limited; if He had not, His knowledge of human life and His presence in it would be limited. Above all, if He would not—if He refused so to demean Himself—then His love would certainly be something far less than that boundless Holy Love and absolute Grace which is revealed in our Lord Jesus Christ.

Literature

LAW AND THE LAWS

In the judgment of many who are preoccupied with law, we have reached the crisis of a deep-seated malady which threatens to bring about the collapse of man as a law-making and law-abiding creature. A capacity for jurisprudence is one of the foundations upon which human dignity and human civilization may be said to rest, and no one who is aware of the present crisis in regard to law can fail to be deeply disturbed. The nature and extent of the crisis are in large measure masked in this country, partly because, as Principal Nathaniel Micklem shows—*Law and the Laws* (Green and Son; 15s. net.)—British law still rests on Christian assumptions about the nature of man which have not been radically called into question yet, and partly because British legal thinking has been traditionally directed towards the empirical problems which arise in connexion with litigation and not towards the larger problems of jurisprudence which loom large in the Law Schools of America and of Continental Europe. The existence of the Law Reform Committee may nevertheless be taken as a sign that this country is not untouched by the crisis. Dr. Micklem is practically alone among British theologians in his concern with this field, and his book, like his notable sermon on 'The Theology of Law' [1943], seeks 'to relate theological and legal theory in a way which will be of service to the lawyer.' He begins by distinguishing between jurisprudence and ethics in their common concern with justice. He finds that theology shares this concern as part of its larger concern with love, and he finds room for marginal comments from a theologian in the fact that law must be regarded as an expression of justice proper to man's nature. Whether a Christian theologian can be content to make his comments by reference to the identity of *ratio, lex, natura,* and *jus* in the *philosophia perennis* and ignore the true proportions of the Biblical theme of righteousness is a matter of some doubt. Continental theologians who are working in close contact with lawyers in order to develop the Christian resources for dealing with the crisis in law have no illusions on the point. It is also pertinent to ask whether any lawyer is likely to feel that his real problems have been exposed by the light which Dr. Micklem chooses to throw on them. He surveys the philosophical conception of law in the classical and medieval tradition in two chapters which are a model of lucid and reliable exposition. He does the same for modern teaching about jurisprudence, expounding Austin, Kelsen and Duguit, Roscoe Pound and Julius Stone, and the Historical School represented by von Savigny. Convinced as he is that there can be no true exposition of law which does not rest on the acknowledgment of a sacred and inviolable order in Nature, with the correlative acknowledgment of a permanent standard of values, he attempts in ch. 8 to reconcile the Natural Law tradition with the insights of modern jurisprudence, and I must leave readers to judge whether pp. 76–81, the real heart of the book, are a significant achievement or a verbal *tour de force.* The comments in succeeding chapters on 'natural rights,' 'international law,' 'corporate personality' and the relation of religion to the State seem to me to be of tremendous value, and so, of course, is the earlier exposition of traditions, ancient and modern. Theologians and ministers can profit greatly from this book, not least because it directs attention to a field which we ignore at our peril. But when they hand it to the lawyers among their flock (for whom, as I suppose, it is principally intended), they may care to have in mind the opinion that this is not the theology of law which is required from the Church in these days, so much as an attempt by a very gifted author to persuade himself that the Classical and Scholastic tradition is still the model for such a theology.

W. A. Whitehouse

THE TRINITY

The Ven. Percy Hartill, B.D., Archdeacon of Stoke-on-Trent, has written an admirable book on the Trinity—*The Unity of God: A Study in Christian Monotheism* (Mowbray; 16s. net). He begins with a lucid account of the dilemma in which the earliest Christians found themselves. On the one hand it was vital to maintain monotheism, on the other they were worshipping Christ as though He were God. Then there was the Holy Spirit. The Church met the difficulty which Jews were not slow to perceive by a re-examination of the conception of the unity of God; and found that that unity was not broken by the idea of diversity within it. Admittedly it took time, it was only in the fourth Christian century that the Trinitarian doctrine was for the orthodox definitely determined.

The author finds the doctrine firmly based on Scripture; his exposition of this will repay study. In the conception of a Triune God there are, of course, difficulties, and Mr. Hartill grants that our best endeavours to find adequate analogies may never be completely successful. He does show that many familiar unities are composite.

All who have to attempt to render Trinitarianism intelligible and reasonable to young people in Confirmation Classes or elsewhere will find Mr. Hartill's exposition invaluable. He proceeds to show how the vital Unity of God has been lost sight of in some doctrines of the Atonement. There is error whenever a state of tension is posited between either Father and Son, or between God's Love and Righteousness.

So in Christian Ethics, he gives penetrating criticism of a 'two-fold morality' as expounded by Bergson and A. D. Lindsay. He is not quite so satisfying in his chapter on the Unity of the Church. To his mind that unity follows from the unity of God, and he holds that the former is not an ideal to be striven for as though it did not exist yet, it *is* in existence already. It is far from clear how he relates this unity of the Church to the divided state of Christendom as we know it.

The book is well documented and well written and is to be cordially welcomed.

W. D. Niven

THE PATRISTIC DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION

It is an odd fact that there is little or no separate literature in English on the Doctrine of Redemption in the earlier patristic writers. Scholars 'tend to hurry over the early centuries and to begin serious discussion with the teaching of St. Anselm and of Peter Abelard.' It is to supply that want that Professor H. E. W. Turner has written *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption* (Mowbray; 12s. 6d. net). Professor Turner finds various basic ideas in the thought of the early patristic writers. (1) The earliest idea is the idea of 'Christ the Illuminator.' Christ is looked on primarily as teacher. 'Not otherwise could we learn what God is if our Teacher the Word had not become man. We could not otherwise learn unless we were to see our Teacher the Word and hear His voice with our ears that we might become imitators of His actions and those who fulfil His words' (Irenaeus). (2) Next there comes the thought of 'Christ the Victor and the Doctrine of Recapitulatio.' This first conception saw in every part of Christ's life—the Birth, the Temptations, the Death, the Resurrection, the Descent into Hades and the Ascension—the triumph over the demons. The second conception turned on the belief that if Christ was to save man He must in His own life recapitulate the whole process of the life of man. (3) The third idea is the idea of 'Christ the Giver of Incorruption and Deification.' This may be summed up in the one sentence, 'He became what we are to make us what He is' (Athanasius). Here we have some of the most daring of all the thoughts. Clement of Alexandria speaks of the Logos deifying man by His teaching and daringly describes the Christian Gnostic as God walking about in the flesh. 'Origen thinks of a hierarchy of being formed by God Himself, the Logos of God, and those who through the Logos of God have begun to receive their deification.' 'The Word became flesh that we might be deified' (Athanasius). Methodius has the daring thought that those who are deified become not merely Christians, but Christs. Regarding this idea two things have to be noted. (i.) This idea of deification is often thought of as being sacramentally mediated. 'The Eucharist is the spiritual food and drink of eternal life.' Ignatius and Irenaeus had already described the Eucharist as the medicine of immortality and the antidote to death. Gregory put it that by the Eucharist Christ inserted Himself as a kind of healing seed into the body of the believer. (ii.) This deification was by no means automatic. It depended on man's repentance and his exercise of his free-will to accept the offer of Christ. (4) There is the idea of 'Christ our Victim.' This is the idea which, because of its clarity of statement, dominated the West. 'To the question *Cur Deus Homo?* the West could return the grim, yet saving, answer, "*Mori missus.*"' Since Christ's death did not arise from anything in Him, it must be done on our behalf as a sacrifice for sin—so Tertullian. Christ 'carried the sins of others' (Cyprian). God aims at the purchase of the salvation of the whole human race by the offer of this perfect and holy victim, said Hilary. 'He underwent death to give satisfaction for those who were under judgment' (Ambrose). 'If man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have come' (Augustine).

This book had its genesis in a series of lectures given at Scholae Cancellariae, Lincoln, during Passion Week in 1949. It is therefore inevitably more of a sketch than a monograph; but it is a really important book. It is a first rate contribution to patristic scholarship. It itself is a masterly summary and introduction to the subject; and it is well calculated to fulfil Professor Turner's aim, that others should be kindled to do yet further work in this far from over-worked field.

William Barclay

DR. JOAD'S RECOVERY OF BELIEF

Dr. C. E. M. Joad is on the way to the recovery of belief, but, in company with all those who take their beliefs seriously, he confesses that he has not got very near to his goal. He has travelled far from his earlier days of materialism and anti-religion, and now holds strongly to a theistic view of the universe. Yet, as he tells us in a postscript which is full of significance, his book—*The Recovery of Belief* (Faber and Faber; 15s. net)—as regards the version of theism maintained by the Christian churches, 'though it holds a brief, makes no case.' He is unnecessarily modest. Although his book is stronger in negation than in affirmation, in its opening critical chapters than in its somewhat incoherent conclusions, it will be of very considerable help to those who, influenced unduly by certain prevalent trends of thought, feel that they are exiles from hope and long for the support of religious belief.

Dr. Joad is frequently autobiographical, and thereby strengthens his argument, for he makes it abundantly clear that he does not proceed from a background of traditional or wishful thinking. His liberating method from the bonds of materialism, pseudo-scientific thought and abstract pantheistic mysticism is often—perhaps too often—of a *tu quoque* character. He uses this with devastating effect in his vehement repudiation of the subjective view of religion and of the current belief that science is necessarily in opposition to religion. He admits that scientists do not now claim to explain the universe—as they used to do fifty years ago—but the trouble is that the plain man thinks they do, which is the disastrous element in the situation. The plain man, he urges, is clearly wrong, seeing that a deterministic naturalism cannot even explain the errors of a schoolboy in connexion with the multiplication table. Neither can such a science deal satisfactorily with the fact of evil. The complacency of the pre-1914 era seems to Dr. Joad intolerably shallow; he perforce abandoned its 'leisured optimism' and 'found himself a Christian,' on the ground that Christianity was an hypothesis which explained the facts of life more satisfactorily than any other.

One wishes, as he himself does, that he could have gone further in the direction of positive belief. He is a little apt to leave us with the feeling that though the Christian churches have not done so very well they have yet made commendable efforts, considering all the circumstances in which they are placed. He has certainly done much to assist those who are travelling along the same road as himself by removing many restrictions which a pseudo-science has unnecessarily and unjustly placed upon Christian doctrine. He acknowledges that many of these doctrines are not congenial to the modern man on the grounds of reason alone, and that they must be accepted on faith. But this faith, he holds, is not a blind faith, and it can justify itself at the bar of reason, because what we do know presents no insuperable obstacle to the religious interpretation of what is unknown, no substitute for Christianity can be shown to be adequate, moral experience demands a supernatural basis, and belief in a God who is at once transcendent and immanent throws light upon recurrent fundamental problems, preparing the way for the acceptance of the 'mighty works' implied in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ. Hesitating to the end, but also unmistakably sincere, Dr. Joad closes on a personal note. 'On the whole I think I can subscribe to the testimony of the innumerable people who have tried to practise Christianity—the thing does, at least sometimes, work.'

W. S. URQUHART

Dr. Lynn Harold Hough, sometime Dean of Drew Theological Seminary, whose preaching is not unknown in this country, is outstanding in America as a leader of the Christian Humanists. His latest work—he is author of many—is entitled *Great Humanists* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; $3.50) and consists of lectures on Aristotle, Cicero, Erasmus, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. Of the five the two last were contemporary. If such a choice strikes one as a little curious, it is nobody's business. The five studies are all interesting, all the more so as Dr. Hough's literary style is captivating. We are aware that to some the very phrase 'Christian Humanism' seems to be self-contradictory. Others will agree with the author that there is nothing in a thinker being a Humanist to prevent him from being a good Christian. Dr. Hough, indeed, holds that true Humanism must be religious, as 'the profoundest study of man leads on to a belief in God.'

We boggle a little at the case of P. E. More who advanced to religious faith out of scepticism and ended by speaking of 'the incompetence of intellect.' Surely that was to abandon Humanism. Nor has Dr. Hough real warrant for his belief or his assumption that if More had lived longer he would have renounced his temporary aberration.

Dr. J. A. Hadfield is one of our most eminent psychologists, especially in the sphere of psychopathology. His book on 'Psychology and Mental Health,' which appeared only two years ago, immediately commanded approbation and such success that a new revised edition is on the way. Meanwhile he has issued an abridgment of the

larger work under the title *Mental Health and the Psychoneuroses* (Allen and Unwin; 10s. net). Its purpose is to give teachers, ministers, students, doctors and any other interested readers who may not have time for the larger work, sufficient knowledge to be of real help to them, and to omit what is of interest mainly to professional psychologists. In this shortened selected form the work will prove exceedingly useful.

Miss Piloo Nanavutty, M.A., M.Litt., who was formerly a lecturer in Wilson College, Bombay, and her collaborator, Dastur F. A. Bode, B.A., a Parsi High Priest, have given us, in small compass, a beautiful translation of the *Songs of Zarathushtrā* (Allen and Unwin; 8s. 6d. net), which are the main part of the Parsi sacred books, and also a very clear and useful introduction, intelligible to any beginner in the study of Zoroastrianism. They claim to have brought out the spiritual significance of the poems to a greater degree than previous translators, and certainly many passages illustrate impressively the devotional mysticism which pervades Zarathushtrā's teaching, entitling him to membership of 'The International of the Spirit,' as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it in the Foreword he contributes. The authors show rather convincingly the affiliation between the Songs and the Indian *Rigveda*, as well as the contrasts, and also point out the influence of Zoroastrianism on Gnosticism and on Jewish and Islamic mysticism.

The trend of the teaching in the Songs here reproduced shows curious traces of the fundamental Parsi dualism between Good and Evil, and Zarathushtrā seems always to be hovering between the doctrines of the eternal punishment of the wicked and a universalism of salvation. His conception of Freedom suggests comparison with some of the speculations of Berdyaev. There is a considerable monotony in the collection of poems here given us, and an excessive fondness for untranslated nomenclature, but a useful glossary (which might have been expanded with advantage) remedies the latter defect.

There are a number of books on Hīnayāna Buddhism, but not nearly so many on Mahāyāna. Mr. C. H. S. Ward has issued a very scholarly one—*Buddhism*: Vol. 2 *Mahāyāna* (Epworth Press; 15s. net)—which will take readers well into the heart of the subject. Dr. Waterhouse, the editor of the series in which it appears, asserts with confidence 'There is no other book in English that does for the student what this does, and I believe it will be a standard text-book upon the subject for many years to come.' Certainly a vast amount of difficult work has gone to the writing of it; and we are grateful to Mr. Ward for a fine work.

It is partly historical, and partly explanatory. The Bodhisattva has a great resolve, which may well make some of us ashamed. Looking out on this troubled world he vows

For the sake of all sentient beings on earth,
I aspire for the abode of enlightenment which is most high:
In all embracing love awakened, and with a heart steadily firm,
Even my life I will sacrifice, dear as it is.
. . . . . .
All sentient creatures from the turbulent waters of the triple world,
I'll release, and to eternal peace them I'll lead.

There are some Christians who have not reached that length.

This fourth impression—after an interval of thirteen years—of an introductory book on ethics—*The Threshold of Ethics*, by the Rt. Rev. K. E. Kirk, D.D., Bishop of Oxford (Skeffington; 8s. 6d. net)—is justified by the relevance of the topics discussed, but we cannot help thinking that a new edition which took account of the development of thought since the close of the First World War would have been much more valuable. Still, it is not intended for specialists who may be expected to be acquainted with the latest speculations, and beginners in the study of ethics will derive much profit from the criticism of generally prevailing tendencies of thought in relation to psychology, evolution, humanism, and their connexion with ethics. As regards psychological determinism Bishop Kirk uses effectively the argument that we would not even be conscious of determinism if we were not also aware of freedom as existing somewhere within our universe of experience. He suggests that evolution has as its consequences either ungrounded optimism, or uncertainty as to moral principles, or pessimism, and cannot supply fundamental moral guidance. His main criticism of modern humanism is that it tends to be utilitarianism in disguise, and does not in any case succeed in dispensing with deeper moral concepts as it pretends to do. The analysis of over-conscientiousness is exceedingly penetrating, and from this the Bishop passes on to a concluding homily on the services which religion may render to ethics. He warns us against relying on the grudging Kantian concessions, and finds its supreme value in the cultivation of the spirit of worship, which will deliver us from self-centredness and from despair, through our communion with the objective Source of our highest ideals.

The Importance of P. T. Forsyth

By the Reverend N. H. G. Robinson, D.Litt., Rothesay

Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in the thought of a Scottish theologian who spent most of his working life in England and whose publications belong to the early years of the present century, P. T. Forsyth. Moreover, there is close at hand a fairly obvious explanation of the increased attention which Forsyth's theological writings have received, for even a cursory perusal of them can hardly fail to disclose the fact that here, in the work of this Anglo-Scottish thinker, we have a quite remarkable anticipation of some of the characteristic positions of the most influential theological school of the present day, and, in particular, of Dr. Karl Barth. A closer acquaintance, however, with Forsyth's work reveals the even more interesting fact that in no small measure Forsyth provides, not just an anticipation of Barthianism, but what many will be disposed to regard as an impressive corrective to some of its glaring defects; and it is the purpose of this paper to illustrate and elaborate that theme.

Dr. Barth's theology is essentially a protest against theological Liberalism or Rationalism, that movement which found its centre of gravity in the reason and moral consciousness of natural men and which frequently justified this approach by insisting that human reason, both theoretical and practical, is the Divine element in our humanity, that is, by emphasizing the immanence of God. It was against all such thoughts that Dr. Barth very firmly set his face. He insisted, not on the immanence of God, but on His transcendence. God is wholly other, and He is neither a man nor an extension of our humanity. Indeed the Divine transcendence, or rather the transcendence of God, is the fundamental keynote of Dr. Barth's entire theology, and it is significant that he prefers to speak of God who is clearly one than of divinity which suggests a quality to be found not only there but here. From this central emphasis there follows closely another, that if we are to know God it can only be by His self-revelation. We cannot discover Him by ourselves. It is only by His grace and at His pleasure that we can come to see Him at all. Reasoned argument, philosophy, metaphysics, natural theology, these can take us no part of the way. We can only go this way to God if God first comes to us, if He reveals Himself, as in fact He has done in Jesus Christ His Son. Jesus, therefore, is essentially the Word of God, the One in whom God reveals Himself to us and declares Himself to all His children. His birth is not just like ours, it is the Incarnation; His death is not just ours, it is the Atonement. Moreover, since God is wholly other and we can only know Him by His own gracious self-revelation, we cannot hope to know Him as we know the objects in the world around us and as perhaps we may come to know our human nature, that is to say, we cannot hope to know God by clear and distinct ideas producing a knowledge marked by transparency and coherence. Rather, in this direction, we shall see through a glass darkly, and there will be many paradoxes and much mystery in our understanding.

These are characteristically Barthian positions, and yet, although some of his work was published before the First World War, P. T. Forsyth provides an impressive anticipation of them. Equally with Dr. Barth he has a quarrel with Rationalism. The crucial question within Christianity, he tells us, is this, 'Is saving faith a Rationalism, *i.e.* a faith in universal ideas, intuitions, or processes, which have no exclusive relation to a fixed point in history? Or is it gathered to such a fixed point, in the historic Christ, where God, in presence, actually offers Himself *to* man in judgment and *for* man in Grace?'[1] 'Are we to demand that Christ shall submit to the standard of certain principles or ideals which we bring to Him from our human nature at its heart's highest and its thought's best? Or as our new creator is He His own standard . . .?'[2] The final issue, he tells us, 'is between a rational Christianity and a redemptive.'[3] Again, he says, the great question within the Church is between theological Liberalism and 'a free but positive theology, which is essentially evangelical.'[4] Moreover, the great fault of Rationalism or theological Liberalism, which Forsyth also describes as ego-centric and anthropocentric, is that in it 'God is drawn into the circle of our spiritual interests, the interests of man's spiritual culture, as its mightiest ally and helper.'[5] It is assumed that 'God were no God if He cared for anything more than He did for His creatures';[6] and the anthropocentric religion which results is marked by 'man's preoccupation with humanity and its spiritual civilization or culture.'[7] Further

[1] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, 95.
[2] *Ib.*, 95.
[3] *Ib.*, 96.
[4] *Ib.*, 84.
[5] *Ib.*, 28.
[6] *The Justification of God*, 3.
[7] *Ib.*, 18.

as Forsyth tells [1] us, the difference between this outlook and its alternative in evangelical theology is that for the former God is immanent, for the latter transcendent. This is the difference between the Reformation and the Illumination; [2] and, says Forsyth quite plainly, 'we take the Reformation side of our Protestantism for a stand, and not the Illuminationist.' [3] Thus Forsyth took his stand in a position later to be occupied by Dr. Karl Barth. Moreover, in taking his stand here, Forsyth put God's revelation of Himself in Christ at the very centre of his thought and theology. 'In the whole region of revelation,' he says [4] of Jesus, 'He carries Himself in a sovereign and final way.' The power of Jesus did not lie in any novel truth that He propounded about man or God, but 'in the new divine personality, and the redeeming, consummating act of God effected in it.' [5] The choice between a doctrine of transcendence and one of immanence is, as we have seen, a choice between a rational theology and a redemptive, and that is now seen to involve a choice between reason and revelation. But revelation must not be rationalized. It is a mistaken treatment of revelation which sees it 'as something propositional rather than redemptive,' [6] and the true idea of revelation is 'destroyed by being viewed as the conveyance of truth about God and His action, instead of God's actual coming and acting.' [7] The truth is that there is a point in history, 'in Christ there is a spot where we are known far more than we know. . . . In Christ God is not preached but present. . . . He does more than justify faith, He creates it.' [8] But if God reveals Himself in Christ creating faith, out of which arises dogma, we must not think that here all things have been made plain. 'No dogma is adequate to spiritual reality.' [9] 'We are known far more than we know.' 'The greatest of realities is the greatest of paradoxes,' [10] and we cannot hope to escape from that general situation.

Quite evidently, then, Forsyth has anticipated Barth in a remarkable and impressive manner. In the one, as in the other, God is regarded as transcendent, revelation is put at the very centre of theology, reason working in the realm of faith is allowed only a modest competence, and the way of rationalism is firmly eschewed. But if the similarities between these two theologians are great, the differences are no less noteworthy, and the careful reader of both must be arrested by the changed 'atmosphere' which he encounters when he turns from the Swiss thinker to the British. If he tries to trace this difference to its source he will find that it arises from a difference in attitude both to reason and, especially, to morality.

Forsyth comes second to none, not even to Dr. Barth, in his opposition to Rationalism, the movement which, in theology, regards man's reason as Divine and capable of scaling the highest heights of reality, nor could any thinker place a greater stress upon God's self-revelation as the indispensable condition of human knowledge of God. But it is one thing to oppose Rationalism and quite another to deny reason, and, while Forsyth always takes the former course, he never follows the latter. Reason is involved in the response to revelation which is called faith, and, although it sees only through a glass darkly and has frequently to be content with paradoxical beliefs, the effort to adjust these 'could only cease with the paralysis of thought.' [11]

When we turn to Barth, however, it is very far from clear that he likewise does not deny reason in opposing Rationalism. For one thing, when he discusses the *imago dei* in man and the effect upon it of human sin he insists on a doctrine of total corruption. There is in man no point of contact left for the Divine revelation, and he argues in the strongest and most emphatic terms that the Christian man is a new creature who owes nothing to the natural man whose place he has taken. Moreover, in outlining the content of Christian faith, as is well known, Barth gave a very prominent place to the element of paradox, so much so indeed that his theology was known for a time as the dialectical theology; and in doing this he not only laid greater stress upon the paradoxical character of faith than Forsyth ever did but he tended to treat his paradoxes, not as accidents, vicissitudes, failures on the part of human reason working in the realm of faith and revelation, but as fixed limits to its activity. Further, although in his later work Barth has admittedly set aside the existentialism which coloured so much of his earlier thought and might therefore be held, and is indeed sometimes held, to have left behind his dialectical theology, this does not seem to be the case. Even in the revised edition of his *Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics* he tells us that 'the Word of God alone fulfils the concept of paradox with complete strictness, whereas in all other thinkable "paradoxes" the opposition between communication and form is such that it can be dissolved from some superior point of vantage.' [12] Certainly, in spite of his doctrine of total corruption and of the total destruction by sin of the *imago dei*

[1] Cf. *ib.*, 68ff.
[2] Cf. *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, 189.
[3] *Ib.*, 192. [4] *Ib.*, 109. [5] *Ib.*, 64.
[6] *The Justification of God*, 83.
[7] *Ib.*, 83. [8] *Ib.*, 44.
[9] *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, 69.
[10] *Ib.*, 70.
[11] *Ib.*, 72.
[12] *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, 189.

in man, he speaks more freely of reason as involved in faith. 'Christendom,' he now says,[1] 'and the theological world were always ill-advised in thinking it their duty for some reason or other, either of enthusiasm or of theological conception, to betake themselves to the camp of an opposition to reason.' 'Christian faith is . . . rational in the proper sense.'[2] Such admissions do suggest that some change has taken place in Barth's own view of the place of reason in Christian faith. In his latest work room is found for reason, but it is reason illuminated by revelation or, more specifically and, one must add, more characteristically, reason completely determined by revelation. 'Knowledge of God is a knowledge completely effected and determined from the side of its object, from the side of God.'[3] Now this is a considerable concession, whether it can be made consistently or not; but it is still a question whether in insisting that this knowledge of God, that reason in this direction, is utterly and *completely* determined and effected from the side of its object, Dr. Barth has not taken away with his left hand what he has given with his right. Here, if deliberate and emphatic language is to be trusted, reason is purely passive. But if that is so it cannot be illuminated, as Barth suggests in one sentence; it can only be determined, as he holds in another, and that wholly and completely. In other words, it is not reason at all, it is the name but not the reality. On this point, surely, it is Forsyth who is nearer the truth. Reason by itself is incompetent in this field, but with revelation it is illuminated, it is quickened, and it is not immobilized and virtually destroyed. No doubt Dr. Barth is afraid that to allow reason any activity whatsoever is to open the door to human error and disloyalty; but, on the other hand, unless reason is active there cannot be loyalty, truth, and obedience.

It is, however, when we consider their respective treatments of morality that the difference between Forsyth and Barth is most clear. As he was in opposition to Rationalism so Barth is to be found in opposition to Moralism. Faith is not morality nor any smooth extension of morality as Liberalism was prone to suppose. Barth, in consequence, dismissed morality as an arbitrary factor in human life on a level with chance, nor does he appear to have reinstated later what he had previously evicted with vehemence. Once again, however, Barth seems to have failed to distinguish between hostility to the undue magnification of a thing and hostility to the thing itself. And yet such a distinction is clearly demanded by the facts. The alternative to tyranny and dictatorship is not anarchy. Likewise the alternative to Moralism in theology is anti-moralism with a hyphen and not antimoralism without it.

Forsyth, on the other hand, never seems to make the mistake of confusing these two very different things. Nothing could be clearer than the moral intention which pervades his whole treatment of evangelical theology. His book on *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ* is appropriately prefaced by a quotation from Bishop Butler to the effect that 'Morality is the nature of things,' and by that is meant a description or indication, not of morality's content and criterion, but of its status. 'The study of theology,' he says in that book,[4] 'must go on and go forward.' 'Dogma is the science of faith,' but that 'means the science of religion when religion rises to the positive faith we have in Christianity, the science of religion as a moral relation, a living and historic relation between two personalities, two consciences; which in Christianity is a redeeming relation.'[5] What is needed is the moralizing of dogma. 'Yet let it not be thought that the moralizing of dogma makes it less urgent, less incumbent, less dogmatic. For what is so insistent, inevitable, and dogmatic as the categorical imperative which is at the moral centre?'[6] Such a theology 'starts from the conviction that for life and history the moral is the real, and that the movements of the Great Reality must be morally construed as they are morally revealed.'[7] To this fundamentally moral conception of theology Forsyth contrives to remain faithful in its detailed elaboration. The plight of natural man is a moral plight. His is a 'dull ethic which takes no measure of either his race's sin or a holy God.'[8] He 'does not face the moral problem between the guilty soul and God';[9] and he does not because as natural man without revelation he cannot. Speaking of the apostles, Forsyth says that the revelation in Christ 'reorganized their whole conceptual world by giving it a new vital centre, and therefore a new reading. They saw a new world because a new king was on its throne.'[10] Even the religion of natural humanity is concerned with man and his weal instead of God and His glory; but the self-revelation in Christ as witnessed in the Gospels and interpreted by the apostles alters this whole situation, and re-establishes it round a new centre, not man but God. 'In Christ God is not preached but present. . . . He does more than justify faith, He creates it. . . . We believe because He makes us believe—with a moral compulsion.'[11]

It is not the purpose of this article to attempt a precise assessment of the adequacy of Forsyth's detailed treatment of his theological themes but

[1] *Dogmatics in Outline*, 22.
[2] *Ib.*, 23.
[3] *Ib.*, 24.
[4] P. 213.
[5] P. 216.
[6] P. 218.
[7] P. 222 f.
[8] P. 91.
[9] P. 24.
[10] P. 161.
[11] *The Justification of God*, 44.

to indicate and evaluate his general approach and, in particular, to contrast it with that of Barthianism; and at once it should perhaps be made clear that the alternative which Forsyth offers to Barthianism is not simply a return to Ritschlianism. The great failure of the Ritschlian system was its inability to measure up to the full truth of an evangelical theology. Its tendency was to bring the revelation in Christ within the narrow compass afforded by the ordinary moral consciousness. But if the mark of a truly evangelical theology is the seriousness with which it treats of this revelation, Forsyth's theology, as well as Dr. Barth's, distinguishes itself decisively from Ritschl's. On the other hand, Forsyth's position is differentiated from Barth's by the fact that its treatment of the revelation is thoroughly ethical or, at any rate, tries incessantly to be so, whereas Barth falls below this level, not only in his predominantly, almost exclusively, negative attitude to morality, but in his conception of human reason in faith as being completely determined by its object and, in consequence, as being perfectly passive. Over against Ritschl, Forsyth and Barth both provide a thoroughly evangelical theology; while over against Barth, Ritschl and Forsyth alike present what is intended to be a completely ethical theology. Ritschl's failure was an evangelical failure, Barth's is an ethical one; while Forsyth's constant endeavour was to outline a theology which would be as ethical as it was evangelical and as evangelical as it was ethical.

In the Study

Virginibus Puerisque

A Christmas Gift

By the Reverend Wilfrid J. Doidge, B.A., B.D.,
Carshalton, Surrey

'To give is happier than to get.'—Ac 20[35] (Moffatt).

I expect that we have all begun our preparations for Christmas. Certainly mothers have. What a grand time Christmas is! Everything is exciting but nothing is more exciting than that moment when we begin to open the mysterious parcels and strangely shaped packages which we know contain Christmas presents. Who does not like getting Christmas presents? It is just lovely to receive them, especially when they come as a surprise. But I am thinking to-day of some words of Jesus which are not in the Gospels. They come at the end of a talk which Paul gave to the leaders of the Church at Ephesus. 'Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, "To *give* is happier than to *get*."' I know a boy who proved that those words are true.

John was wondering how Father Christmas managed to know exactly what everybody wanted. How does he know what Daddy wants? This puzzled John until a marvellous idea came to him. This year, he thought, I'll be a Father Christmas myself and that will make quite sure that Daddy gets something which he will like. All the following week he watched the shops, looking for something which Father would like but which did not cost very much, for John had only been able to save two shillings and there were many things to buy and places to visit during the holidays.

One day he was passing a second-hand shop. He always stopped to look at the queer collection of vases, furniture, pictures and a hundred other odds and ends. That day he saw a row of books. Father liked reading. Was there anything good enough for him?—for John knew that Father would enjoy only the best books. Some of the books were torn, some were faded, some were very small. There was one, however, which attracted his attention. It was a large book with gold edges and gold printing on the back. John looked at it for a long time and the more he looked the more he was sure that Daddy would like that book. He took it off the shelf. It was heavy; *so* different from the other little books. And what did the gold letters say? 'The Sunday Reader,' and a date was printed which showed that it was a very, very old book—and Daddy was quite old too! How much did it cost? 'One and sixpence,' said the shopkeeper, 'but I will let you have it for a shilling.' That was a lot of money for John. It was a half of all his savings: but the book was for Father. John

thought a long time. Could he afford it? He left the shop and had walked to the end of the street when he said to himself, 'It *is* for Daddy: I'm sure he'd love it' and back to the shop he went, paid his shilling and hurried home with the large volume under his arm.

Then another problem came to him. Father ought not to see the book before Christmas. John smuggled it in under his coat. Fortunately no one was about at the time. He hurried to his bedroom, climbed on to a table and put the book on the top of his wardrobe. There it lay till Christmas Eve—whether any one saw it he never knew. Then the secret wrapping of the parcel! Then the opening by Father—didn't his eyes shine when he saw a little note with the words, 'With love from Santa Claus and John.' He turned to John with that big smile which only Daddy had as he said, 'Why, John, this is just the very thing I wanted.' (Mummy knew that that was perfectly true—not that Daddy especially wanted that book but he was thrilled to know that John was unselfish: that made the gift 'just the very thing he wanted.')

Of course, John himself had some beautiful presents and he enjoyed the whole of Christmas day, but as he went to bed that night he was still thinking of Daddy's look and his words. They had been the loveliest thing of the day and he was ever so glad that he had spent a lot of his money on that book. John had certainly discovered for himself the truth of the words of Jesus, 'To give is happier than to get.' And I know why that is true. Christmas day gives us the secret. On that day God gave: and God is always giving Himself to us and for us.

A Labour of Love

By the Reverend Charles M. Hepburn, B.D., Crieff

'He hath made every thing beautiful. . . .'—Ec 3^{11}.

Like thousands of other visitors I was in Edinburgh in August for the Musical Festival, and wanting to see some of the sights of the city I bought an interesting book—*Edinburgh and the Lothians*. It tells about old castles and churches and other things in the city and the neighbourhood. One chapter is headed 'A Fable in Stone,' which refers to Rosslyn Chapel, which I felt I had to visit. Inside, unfortunately, it wasn't well lit and one couldn't see the wonders of it properly, although a photograph in the book, which evidently had been taken by flash-light, shows just how marvellous it must be, 'a veritable jungle of carving in stone,' as it says. By the way, the writer adds that it inspired a shepherd's boy from nearby to become an architect, who in time conceived and created that astonishing Scott Monument in Princes Street. But to return to Rosslyn, it was built by the orders of the third Earl of Orkney, of whom it says 'his age creeping on him . . . it came in his mind to build a house for God's service,' and built it was in the year of God 1401, that is, over five hundred and fifty years ago. Among the scenes carved in stone are an orchestra of angels playing all sorts of instruments, including the bagpipe—very suitable for a musical festival; Samson slaying the lion; the Prodigal Son feeding swine; a fox carrying off a goose with a farmer pursuing; and all kinds of foliage in stone—oak leaves, ferns, curly kail, and strange plants, like the cactus, from other lands.

It has, however, one special glory, a particular pillar, which is superior to all the others. According to the story the master mason was shown a sketch of a lovely pillar and ordered to make one like it. As, however, he found himself incapable of completing the pillar, he went to Italy to examine the original one. On coming home again he found his apprentice had worked with a will and had finished it, as it is now, with chains of flowers in stone, wreathed around it from the foot to the top. Sad to say, though, instead of being pleased about it, the master mason was bitterly envious, and, it is declared, had his poor apprentice put to death. That, then, is the story of 'The Prentice Pillar.'

As I looked at its loveliness I thought to myself what a splendid illustration of 'a labour of love.' Anything we do lovingly we'll very likely do well. In some cases, indeed, it is absolutely necessary for fine workmanship. Last century in London there was a man who made wonderful violins and won medals for them. It appears he possessed that caressing touch and that power of choosing the best-suited wood which that Italian master had who fashioned the world-famous Strads. Then, as he was growing old, some one suggested he might be the better of a little help. 'No!' he said. 'This work is no good unless there is love in it.' So I can't help thinking this world with its sun and its stars, its trees and its flowers, and 'all things bright and beautiful' is full of such beauty because God, the great Creator, who, the writer of Ecclesiastes said, 'made every thing beautiful,' loved making it all. In finishing then I would simply say, don't forget to put plenty of love into your work, whatever it is. Make of it 'a labour of love' and you'll do it well.

The Christian Year

CHRISTMAS DAY

Why Christmas?

BY THE REVEREND JOHN R. GRAY, B.D., GLASGOW

'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.'—Jn 18^{37}.

A characteristic of Church leaders which is somewhat irritating is that they are always viewing something or other 'with alarm.' Two hundred years ago it was Romanism, a century ago it was Republicanism, fifty years ago it was the criticism of the Bible, nowadays it is Communism. If we really believe in God, we have the least cause for alarm of anybody in the world, for it is God's world, and in it He has set His Church, and surely we can trust Him to take care of them and of us. Communism, that upstart faith, certainly should not alarm us; its Bible, Marx's *Das Kapital*, is a dull, ponderous tome, riddled with fallacies, and as close to real life as the wax fruit in a Victorian drawing-room. Yet, this has to be said for Communism and those who believe in it, they do see some meaning in life, albeit a somewhat inadequate one. At least the thing makes sense to them.

The real enemies of religion are not those with a wrong belief about life, but rather those with no beliefs about it at all. There are many such in our day. Of course the ordinary man in the street—if there is such a person—does not speak like that. He does not say 'Life is finally meaningless,' but he uses phrases which imply it—'What's the use?,' 'Who cares?,' 'What's the odds?,' 'What's the sense?,' 'Why bother?,' 'I'm fed-up.' Now, although he may not work it out, these phrases all add up to the assertion that there is nothing significant in life, no sense or meaning or value or purpose; that it is just a dreary round of getting born, growing up, eating and drinking, and dying after we have started a new generation on the same endless belt of futility, disturbed for a little by those strong emotions of love, sorrow or hate, but all amounting to the same in the end—nothing; and all ending in the same blank nothingness of death.

Not only do some, perhaps a majority of our fellows, imply this view of things by their catch-phrases and by their thinking, but they live it. Increasingly, people are refusing to make efforts or sacrifices, to work hard or deny themselves. Things like honour, integrity, and promise-keeping, are quite openly flouted, so that we hardly any longer expect people to honour their agreements, or to keep their word. It is no wonder that we feel sometimes that we are living in a kind of moral vacuum.

Now, there is a name for this view of the utter meaninglessness of all of life—it is Nihilism. It is a dreadful sort of view, and most of us flee from it as we would from madness. We flee from it whither? Unless I am wrong, we flee from it by closing our eyes to the whole question of the meaning of life, and by forming a little cluster of meanings and purposes of our own. Have you ever tried one of those really enormous jig-saw puzzles? If you have, and if your time is not unlimited, you've probably given up quite soon the attempt to sort it all out or see the whole picture. Most of us content ourselves with picking out a little bit which is easily recognized. We then put the few adjacent pieces together and leave the rest in chaos. Do not most of us do the same thing with life? We say that it is all very difficult and complicated and perplexing, so we take our own little bit—home, family, and job—and we try to find the meaning for all of life in that little bit with which we are in closest touch. Most people know enough to be honourable to wife or husband, to do their best for their family, and to do their work reasonably conscientiously. Beyond that they are apt to close their minds to the larger issues or to the meaning of the whole. In Washington there is a huge cathedral planned. Meantime it is about half-finished, and some people suggest that it will never be more complete than it now is; that the authorities will settle down with what should be part of the larger whole, and pretend that it is the whole. That, I suggest, is what many of us do with life. We take a fragment of it—our fragment—and say that that is all. We build our lives round our own little bit of the jig-saw and forget the larger whole. That works well enough for a time until our own little fragment begins to break up. We have to retire from our job. Our home life changes. Death confronts us—death that makes nonsense of any view of life which tries to ignore it. If the whole meaning of life for us is in our work, or our home, or our children, then all meaning is taken from it if these are taken from us. The only truth that is worth having is a truth which death cannot touch.

What has all this got to do with Christmas? A very great deal. We have surrounded Christmas with a vast conglomeration of things—cards and presents, dozens of Santa Clauses, turkey, holly, mistletoe, Christmas trees, robins and plum pudding, pantomimes and sherry. Cutting out all of this, all the commercialism and rigmarole and paraphernalia, what is Christmas all about

in its starkest, barest simplicity? It is the celebration of the fact that Christ was born. What difference does that make to us in our ordinary life, in our work and play, in our joys and sorrows? Why was He born? Probably the best thing to do is to ask Christ that question. It is a question He answers, has answered for all time in the text with which we began. He answered it, not sentimentally but in terms of utter gravity. He said 'to this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.'

At this point of time in this place, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two years ago, in Bethlehem of Judea, One was born who, for the first time, put sense and meaning into life, who told the truth about it, not a little bit here and there, but the whole truth about the whole of life, including death. That is why we celebrate, or should celebrate, the Saviour's birth, for in Him and through Him life takes on meaning. For the first time our little lives, with their strivings and their struggles, their efforts and their dreams, take on a significance and a purpose, not for a little, but for ever.

For countless years our Highland rivers roared through the gullies, strong and beautiful, but accomplishing nothing, until electricity came, and all that power was geared and linked to the vast needs of the great world. For centuries before Christ the life of man had been going on; the striving and effort of generation after generation had been poured out, but somehow it had led nowhere. Christ geared it, so to speak, linked it to the eternal, to the truth of God.

Christ, as He faced Pilate, looked back on the life He knew must soon end—looked back on it whole from the oft-told story of His birth in the manger to the Agony in Gethsemane. As He looked back He knew with certainty that God meant it to be lived for one great purpose—to show men the truth, not the truth about this or that but THE TRUTH; the final, total truth which should make them free. 'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto THE TRUTH.'

Is that too stark and astringent a message for Christmas? I think not. For it is only as we see through the fog of sentimentality to the heart of the matter, only as we let Christmas cast its light over all else that we do, and think, and say, and are on every day of the year, that we can have a truly Happy Christmas. Otherwise it is only a refuge of lies from a life of futility.

It will not be that, and it cannot be that, if we take Christ's own interpretation of its meaning. 'To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth'—from birth to death and beyond it for ever.

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER CHRISTMAS DAY

Time—Long or Short

BY THE REVEREND R. W. STEWART, B.D., B.Sc., GLASGOW

'But forget not this one thing, beloved, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.'—2 P 3^{8} (R.V.).

The ending of another year is a reminder of the passing of time. The clock measures time at an even pace, but for some people it passes quickly, while for others it seems to drag. Here is a text that Peter writes down with what may strike the reader as curious enthusiasm—'forget not this one thing,' Peter says as if it was to him a great and inspiring truth. 'One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.' What is exciting about this? What is particularly impressive or comforting in it? What indeed does it mean? As a bare fact it strikes one as altogether mysterious.

1. One suggestion in it is that time has no arithmetical measure.

One may readily accept the idea that man's ways of counting are as nothing in the sight of God and in the light of eternity. We have difficulty, for example, in thinking about the pre-existence of Christ, or about the interval, if any, between death and judgment; and no doubt this is due to the attempt to carry our ways of reckoning time into our thoughts about eternity. This text might be read as a short, sharp reminder that such mysteries are not to be solved by mathematics. God's time has no arithmetic. 'One day is with the Lord as a thousand years.'

This is in line with the reflections of many modern thinkers upon time. Is eternity just an infinitely long time? Or is it not an essentially different kind of experience? And what is time? It is a familiar notion to measure it in bits—a minute, a day, an hour—and to picture it as stretching out like a long line. But it is not given to us in bits; it flows on. And if we try to think of one bit we find it really includes something of the past and involves something of the future. One cannot, for example, give any meaning to just one note in a tune by itself. One has to appreciate it as part of the tune, linked to what comes before and after. So perhaps one can hardly think of a bit of time without thinking of it all.

And what is bare time, in itself, apart from what happens in it? Time is calculated by movements of things, the swing of a pendulum, the circling of the sun; but if there were no things moving would there be any way of measuring or even of realizing time?

It cannot, however, be supposed that Peter has in mind these queer scientific questions about time. This remark of his is really a combination of quotations from two Psalms—and the Psalms are poetry. The first suggestion here is surely that in a dreamy poetical sort of way he reflects that time cannot be measured at all, in any way that is worth while. What matters is not whether it is long or short but what it contains. One hour may hold nothing of value, another may be filled by the clash of great events. One day's battle may change history, as when free Greeks withstood the hosts of Persian tyranny at Marathon. One moment may hold in a quick throb of emotion a hundred mingled memories of hopes and fears. In an instantaneous flash of intuition one scientist may make a great discovery; another man's grand result could not have been reached except by the plodding labour of a life-time. Why care then about measuring time? What matter if a task takes long if it is done? What matter if a good life be short?

Chimes that keep time are neither slow nor fast,
Not many are the numbered sands or few.
A time to suffer and a time to do
And then the time is past.

Is life long or short? No worth-while answer comes from watching the clock. What counts is whether time is rich in loving and noble deeds. Men living thus are neither bored nor hurried. Their lives are not stale and flat, nor, on the other hand, are they feverishly rushed. There is little truth in saying that a party lasted three hours or a song three minutes. The reality is just that it was a jolly party or a lovely song. The important fact about last year or next year is its happiness, its usefulness, the loving-kindness put into it, the labour for others, the thanksgiving to God, the prayers.

As Browning's Grammarian exclaims—

What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes!
Man has Forever.

In some noble sense time may be disregarded. Real life is concerned with love and truth and beauty, with things that belong to eternity.

2. All the same, the text admits that time may feel short or long, as a thousand years or as a day. So consider first how a brief span of time may seem long.

This may be because it is full of movement and colour. Sir Walter Scott says:

One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name.

And Keats—

A thing of beauty is a joy for ever.

Tighnabruaich in the Kyles of Bute is a very wet spot. 'Why spend your fortnight's holiday there?' one Glasgow man asked his friend. 'Well,' was the reply, 'you may get only one day in the fortnight, but a sunny day in Tighnabruaich is worth a fortnight anywhere else.' Yes, one day may excel a thousand by every calculation except that of the clock. And the author of Ps 84, which Peter is here quoting, feels in this way about the joy of worship. His delight in holy things gives to a few short hours in the Temple a quality and value without measure. 'O Lord of Hosts,' he exclaims, 'a day in thy courts is better than a thousand.'

And a brief time may seem long because of its sorrow. A little child may feel an hour long and slow because his mother is away, so that when she returns he greets her with a shout of welcome as if she had been away a thousand years. When mortal anxiety invades a home and life hangs in the balance the dark hours move with leaden feet, and one brief night seems endless.

In that poem, *The Blessed Damozel*, Rossetti says of those who mourned her,

to them she left, her day
Had counted as ten years.

and then he adds in a passionate parenthesis about her lover,

To one, it is ten years of years.

And still more miserably when shame has to be faced, the tarnishing of an honoured name, the wreck of the fair fame of one close and dear, the sudden pain is a slow agony and one day brings a withering like old age.

With such facts about human life in mind the words 'With the Lord one day is as a thousand years' may be taken to mean that God's way of feeling is like ours. 'Can a maid forget her ornaments, or a bride her attire,' says God to Jeremiah, 'yet my people have forgotten me days without number.' Add to that, 'with the Lord one day is as a thousand years.' It lays bare the heart of God. It is the measure of God's pain. Or think of that place in the New Testament that haunts the memory, where Jesus says, 'Behold, I stand at the door, and knock.' How does it feel to Him to be kept outside the life into which He

is waiting to bring forgiveness and new hope? What is it to the Saviour to endure another day of disappointed love, to be again for another day despised—and rejected? 'With the Lord one day is as a thousand years.' These words are not a sort of superhuman arithmetic. They are an indication of the Divine long-suffering. Grieve not then by delaying the Holy Spirit. For 'one day is with the Lord as a thousand years.'

3. If a brief span of time can thus feel large, consider also how a long time may feel short. The other Psalm in Peter's mind is the ninetieth, where one verse runs, 'For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night.'

Even men to some degree may feel this. The hours fly unheeded in listening to music or watching a play. In the Old Testament story the seven years that Jacob served for Rachel 'seemed unto him but a few days, for the love he had to her.' A man leaves home to work abroad for years and when he returns his children hardly know him, but his wife greets him as though he had been absent just a day. A whole long period may in retrospect shrivel up and be as almost nothing. So, looking forward in faith and expectation, Paul exclaims, 'Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.'

This fact that a long period may feel or seem short can enter religious thinking in two ways. For one it may be consolation to reflect that on the Divine scale and in God's infinite plan what seems to men long may be but a little while. This Psalmist is, as men often are, depressed by the apparent waste and futility of long years that have held mostly sorrow and disappointment. But they may be only a small prelude to the unfolding of the Divine purpose. The calculation has been made that if all the past duration of the world were indicated by a line a mile in length then the past indicating the total of known human history would be less than one inch. In the light of eternity the sum of human time may be very small and its evil quickly over. 'For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past.'

Yet once again it is not enough to give the Psalmist's words just an arithmetical meaning. When we read 'in thy sight,' we think of God's mercy and compassion. What is His word of mercy? 'I, even I, am he,' He saith, 'that blotteth out thy transgressions. For my name's sake, and will not remember thy sins.' The long unlovely time of sin will not be reckoned by His pardoning love.

So when Peter pieces together words from two Psalms, and makes this sentence, 'one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day,' it is not for the sake of queer arithmetic but for the poetry in them and their way of sounding out the gospel. One day is worth a thousand if it is lived in fellowship with God enriched by charity and lit up by hope.

O happy day, that fixed my choice.

And a thousand days of sin and shame may in the glory of God's mercy be forgotten in one day of penitence and deliverance. The blessed way to reckon time is not by arithmetic but by God's measure.

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER CHRISTMAS

Heavenly Guidance

BY THE REVEREND A. D. HARCUS, O.B.E., M.A., D.D., LONDON

'We have seen his star.'—Mt 2^{2}.

Christmas and New Year's Day follow each other in quick succession. Only a few days ago we were living over again a story nearly two thousand years old. It has a romantic setting made living and graphic in a way unknown in our youth by means of broadcasting. In music and drama the Christmas story is brought home, literally brought home, to multitudes who normally are outside the circle of religious ordinances. They hear in many beautiful programmes of the shepherds, the angels, and the Babe in the manger. It is a lovely story but told in this way there is always the danger of thinking of it as only a tale that is told, the danger of 'make-believe.' And then, so quickly hard realities impose themselves on mind and imagination, we face the New Year, the unknown to-morrow, shadowed by the anxieties and fears of to-day. It is just at this juncture that what might be called the second part of the Christmas narrative is read and has the effect of joining these widely different thoughts. Here is a record of guidance, of wise men travelling a long distance at times across the trackless desert, brought safely to journey's end. Journey's end for them but for mankind the beginning of a new journey, and the end is not yet. And the star which led them to where the Infant Child lay becomes for us a symbol full of meaning as we face the next stage of our earthly journey. For we, too, have seen His star.

The star is the symbol of guidance. Given that, almost all other problems become subordinate; without it life is in danger of losing its meaning and value. If one is sure of the way then all else can be faced—hardships, difficulties, perils.

And all I ask is a tall ship and a star to steer
her by.

Our prayer therefore for the New Year is that we may be sure of the way. If there is certainty of guidance through all the events and happenings in the days to come who would not gladly say that this is the best gift of all?

To say that the star signifies light is only part of the truth, its real significance is that it is seen amid the surrounding darkness. Is it an over-straining of the analogy, too fanciful, to suggest that the need for guidance is felt when all is dark, that just at that point guidance is most clearly given? There is a message here for times like these. The comparison is between the day of easy prosperity and the night of anxiety and fear. It is near a paradox to suggest that though normally it is in the daytime that the way is clearly seen, yet in terms of the story the wise men got their guidance in the night when the star was visible. There has been in history this alternation between periods of prosperity and depression, of confident hope and dark despair. It was the people that walked in darkness who saw a great light; and even more significant for this age of fear, 'they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined.'

The star is set high in the heavens. For certain tasks the light must be at one's feet, a stable lantern held low was needed at the last stage, but for the journey across the desert there had to be the star high above them and far ahead. And Scripture abounds in references to the Christ set on high. He was the Dayspring from on high who visited us and after His life on earth, God set Him on high. Again and again the phrase is used 'far above.' In the great descriptive passage in Philippians St. Paul, having graphically portrayed the descent from heaven to share in the life of man, comes to the climax in these words, 'Wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.' All the more because He came down to earth from heaven Scripture is emphatic that His real place is not on earth but in heaven. And therefore the essential for us is worship and the approach is through prayer. In the story this is made clear, for when they saw the young child they fell down and worshipped. Christ, our guiding star, is in the heavens, far above all things and if we seek His guidance it must be through adoration, worship, and prayer. Life to-day is so apt to be self-contained. It is like one of the great modern ships, everything is there, every possible want and desire is provided for. But suppose the ship had no destination, drifting or even steaming hard but with no definite harbour in view. This is a generation which seems to have everything except confidence in its own future. Compared to the world which the wise men knew we are rich beyond their dreams, only they had a guiding star. Some one has said that man to-day has lost the 'God-dimension.' That can only come back, and with it the sense of guidance, through the recovery of worship.

So far and so near. And yet the Christmas message remains, an integral part of the Christian Faith, Emmanuel, God with us. Years after the writers of the New Testament, worshipping, proclaiming Him Lord, far above all things, could also speak of One who had dwelt among them, whom they had seen with their eyes. And through that personal contact has come the rich store of Christian experience, revealed so clearly in the hymns of our faith. The greater saints of all the ages, they who worshipped so profoundly, they also reveal an inner life of close personal fellowship. Indeed, it is just here that the analogy breaks down, as all attempts to convey the meaning of the spiritual in terms of the material must ultimately do. A star is something far away, coldly remote, but of the living Christ one poet has dared to write:

> But warm, sweet, tender, even yet
> A present help is he;
> And faith has still its Olivet,
> And love its Galilee.

And this surely is the glory of our faith, a glory that is unique, so far and yet so near.

And so we go forward into the New Year confident that whatever way lies before us, we shall have guidance. And the guiding hand will chart not only the whole journey from beginning to end but will be our strength and stay every day and every hour. To bring the words of the Psalmist into the full revelation of the gospel 'Christ will be a lamp unto our feet and a light unto our path.'

First Sunday after Epiphany

The Consecrated Life

By the Reverend T. Tudor Rhys, B.A., B.D., Hinckley

'I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service. . . . So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.'—Ro 12^{1-5}.

The all-alone is, for that reason, the meaningless. One has only to read the first and the last

verses of our text to see that the consecrated life is a life that has been saved from its solitariness and given a significance.

1. The consecrated life is, in the first place, *a life surrendered.* 'I beseech you . . . that ye present your bodies.' On our human side there must always be that initial act of faith, the willingness to take a risk without waiting for proofs or verification or reward. There must be that disinterested state of mind that is ready to take a 'leap in the dark,' to make a 'venture into the unknown' without asking: 'What am I going to get out of this?' These words were found written in a child's hand in a destroyed air-raid shelter in Cologne:

I believe in the Light, even when the sun does not shine.
I believe in Love, even when it is not given.
I believe in God, even when His voice is silent.

What, then, is it that we are asked to surrender? The answer is here: 'I beseech you . . . that ye present your bodies.' My 'body' stands for that which is essentially mine. Your 'body'—and of course your control of it, is that which is 'you' and nobody else. That is what we are asked to surrender. 'There may be very little difference between one man and another, but what difference there is is very important.' Present that. Offer that. And, in the second place, give it all, 'all your faculties,' as Weymouth puts it. Jesus Himself stresses the importance of the spirit of abandon in our surrender to Him and to His cause. The widow cast in all she had into the treasury. The merchant sold all for the sake of the incomparable pearl and His disciples left all to follow Him.

2. In the second place, the consecrated life is *a life controlled.* 'Holy and acceptable unto God.' The consecrated life is a life under the direction and discipline of a Master. The importance of being willing to take the risk of faith was stressed just now, but, in fact, the act of faith is never a venture in a vacuum. There is no absolute beginning to the life of faith for behind the venture of faith, and forming the ground for it, are 'the mercies of God.' And prior to the venture of faith, being the reward of it, are 'the mercies of God.' The consecrated life is not 'an encounter with Nothingness,' it is the entering into a new relationship with the living God. That is to say, the consecrated man lives his life under a directive and a discipline—as Paul did. 'I say, through the grace given unto me. . . .' He was a man under and with authority, taking his orders from One greater than himself.

Paul once had an experience which re-ordered the whole of his life. He was 'caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.' John Keats had a similar experience. 'I will clamber through the clouds,' he wrote, 'and I will get such an accumulation of stupendous recollections that, as I walk through the suburbs of London, I may not see them.' Both lived their lives under a kind of control. Robert Sencourt says in his book on St. Paul that there were some things which Paul never mentions in his writings. 'He hardly noticed the violet or narcissus, or bloom on almond and peach, or the freshness of colour on Parnes or Hymettus.' There were bigger things to which Paul was oblivious. He never mentions a vision which, to some of us, is still a precious possession—the sunrise on snow-capped Olympus. And how we would welcome a note by Paul on the academies of Athens, the commerce of Corinth, the rule of imperial Rome. But there is nothing. And that is because he is preoccupied with something greater, with the Kingdom of God and with the salvation of men. He was a man under orders.

To what extent is mine a consecrated life? To the extent to which I take my orders from the Master. There is no such thing as absolute freedom. A man is only free to choose his own master. As our Lord says: a man can serve Mammon or he can serve God—he cannot serve both. But he must serve either the one or the other.

3. In the third place, the consecrated life is *a life empowered.* 'But be transformed by the entire renewal of your minds, so that you may learn by experience what God's will is—that will which is good and beautiful and perfect' (Weymouth). One of the most potent agencies at work in Nature and in history is that which is responsible for the process of 'permutation'—of changing the order of one kind of energy into an energy of another order. When that happens there is often a heightening of potential which can be very startling in the physical world. Dr. Pirenne, of Aberdeen University, said in his paper at the British Association meeting in Belfast in September that 'if the energy needed to lift a pea one inch were transformed into light, it could show a flash of light to all the men who ever lived.' May I compare a great thing with an infinitely greater? The most powerful and beneficent process of 'permutation' is that which is wrought through the agency of the Holy Spirit—who transforms the energy generated upon the Cross into an energy made available for you and me 'so that you may learn by experience what God's will is.'

Instances of this process may be quoted from the story of Paul—of the transference of energy

from the sphere of supernatural grace—'He died for all,' into the sphere of Christian character and conduct—'I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me.' The consecrated life is the life empowered by the transmutation of Divine energy operating on the Cross so that, through the agency of the Holy Spirit, it is made available for and accessible to the humblest believer in his or her pilgrimage through this world and into the next.

4. Lastly, the consecrated life is *a life re-valued*. 'I warn every individual among you not to value himself unduly, but to cultivate sobriety of judgement in accordance with the amount of faith which God has allotted to each one' (Weymouth). What is the worth of a man? Is human life in itself sacred—quite apart from its moral quality and content? Is capital punishment, is war at all times and in all circumstances to be considered wrong for the sole reason that the life of every human individual is in itself inviolable? A tormenting question! But the fact of consecration throws some light upon it. The consecrated life is the revalued life.

What gives the consecrated life its value is, first, its relationship to God. 'Fear not: for I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name; thou art mine.' And there is the greatest word of all on human valuation: 'For God so loved the world that . . . *whosoever* believeth.' Every man, any man—if he will, can fill in the dotted line with his own name. So, in estimating the worth of man, we must take into account the counsel of Paul and 'think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith.' Or, as a more recent prophet put it: 'it is the God-relationship that makes man a man.'

Secondly, what gives the consecrated life its value is its worth to the community. We are familiar to-day with the notion that man is a social being and that what the individual produces contributes to the wealth of the community as a whole. There is, however, a Christian scale of values which starts from the other end. The community as a whole pours its riches into the individual. The one lost sheep in our Lord's parable was worth looking for and finding because—until it was found again, the harmony of the whole was broken and there was something missing in the symmetry of the entire scheme of things. The value of the one was enhanced by the added worth of the whole and the life of the whole consecrated by the care and love of the Shepherd. 'So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.' What wonder is it then that there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth!

Second Sunday after Epiphany

Obedience

By the Reverend Stewart Mechie, M.A., Glasgow

'But be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves.'—Ja 1[22].

When will some Christian poet arise to give the world an Ode to Obedience comparable in range and insight to Wordsworth's Ode to Duty? Let it not be accounted presumption if we try to offer this future poet some thoughts which, transmuted by the power of imagination and clothed in a vesture of adequate words, may be incorporated in such an ode.

1. *Obedience brings a man into line with the purpose of God.* In his great roll-call of the heroes of faith the writer to the Hebrews has some moving words about the father of the faithful. 'By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed; and he went out, not knowing whither he went.' It would seem that if there is a knowledge which comes through faith, as there surely is, there is also an ignorance which pertains to faith—'not knowing whither he went.' Nevertheless Abraham, when he was called, obeyed. The call meant a challenge to forsake familiar places and familiar ways. It meant uncertainty and risk in a future sure to be novel and strange. Abraham had no security, save in God; but he obeyed. We see now what was at stake in that decision. It led Abraham along many a weary mile and into many a difficult situation; but it made his name to be honoured to this day by the followers of three great religions—Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. It aligned him with the eternal redemptive purpose of God, nay, it gave him a vital place in that purpose, for of his stock were the people of the Jews, of whom, according to the flesh, Christ came. All that became Abraham's portion because, when the call of God came, he obeyed.

Abraham was unique in the story of salvation: no one can take the place that he holds; but in his ready obedience he was far from unique. Time would fail to tell of the heroes of faith who, like him, when they were called, obeyed. Do we not know something of this ourselves? It may have been the call to a life-work, or the call to a costly renunciation, or the call to succour an unfortunate who crossed our path; but, when we obeyed, we knew a deep satisfaction such as makes us able to understand what Professor Hocking had in mind when he spoke of the swing of a man's arm coinciding with the arc of the Divine purpose.

2. *Obedience brings us into touch with the peace and power of God.* One of the most fruitful adolescent conversions in recent centuries was that of William Booth, and in it there was a crisis

of obedience which is instructive in this regard. About the age of fifteen Booth began to realize the superiority of the religious life and to long to have a part in it. 'I wanted to be right with God. I wanted to be right in myself. I wanted a life spent in putting other people right.' In his sixteenth year the turning-point was reached. 'The Inward Light revealed to me that I must not only renounce everything I knew to be sinful, but make restitution so far as I had the ability for any wrong I had done to others before I could find peace with God.' There was, indeed, something that weighed upon his conscience. In a boyish trading venture he had contrived to make a profit out of his associates while giving them to suppose that he had acted all along in the way of friendship, and in gratitude they had given him a silver pencil-case. To return the gift would have been easy; but it was hard to face the humiliation of having to confess his deception. 'I remember,' he wrote, 'the spot in the corner of the room under the chapel, the hour, the resolution to end the matter, the rising up and rushing forth, the finding the young fellow I had chiefly wronged, the acknowledgment of my sin, the return of the pencil-case—the instant rolling away from my heart of the guilty burden, the peace that came in its place, and the going forth to serve my God and my generation from that hour.' Again, do we not know something of this? The circumstances may have been less easily explained than in Booth's case, the emotional tension may have been less or more, but we made the great decision of obedience and found, possibly to our amazement, that the barriers were down, that there was flowing into our restless and impotent natures nothing less than the peace and power of God. Obedience proved to be the point of vital contact.

3. *Obedience tests the reality of faith and opens the door to faith.* The words 'deceiving your own selves' suggest the danger which lurks in any self-estimate in the realm of faith. 'Trust and obey' is a phrase hallowed by use in preaching as well as by Sankey's hymn, and the collocation of terms is not accidental. If we trust we shall obey; but if we do not obey we must question whether we trust, whether our supposed faith may not be a delusion. The connexion, however, between faith and obedience is yet more subtle and intimate. All who have been brought up in the tradition of the Reformation are familiar with the thought that faith is primary and works of obedience are its fruit. That is true and important, but there is more to be said, and one may say it in the words of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, that hero and martyr of the German Church, who was executed in 1945 a few days before the camp in which he was held prisoner was over-run by the Allies. 'Only he who believes is obedient, and only he who is obedient believes. It is quite unbiblical to hold the first proposition without the second. . . . For faith is only real when there is obedience, never without it, and faith only becomes faith in the act of obedience.'

It is a notable fact that Jesus frequently commanded men to do something in order that they might realize their faith. To the man with the withered hand He said, 'Stretch forth thine hand.' To the paralysed youth He said, 'Arise, take up thy bed and go thy way into thine house.' To the middle-aged paralytic at the pool His order was, 'Take up thy bed and walk.' Strange commands these seem; for were these things not precisely the things in each case which the men could not do? Yet Jesus gave the command and they obeyed. Was His purpose to challenge them with an impossibility, so that in their impotence and self-despair they would be thrown back utterly on the goodness and power of God? At all events, this way of action is the way, if not for all, certainly for many. As Denney once put it, 'No intellectual difficulties are ever supposed in the Gospel, for there are no intellectual requirements. But there is always something to *do* or to *bear*. What it is, we must find out for ourselves in Jesus' presence: but as we do it, the true religion will rise up within us, assured, emancipating, full of a deep peace and joy.' Thus faith becomes faith in the act of obedience.

4. *Obedience is the characteristic offering of the saved to the Saviour.* That is true of the individual believer, and it is true of the saved community, the Church. 'We love,' says St. John, 'because he first loved us'; and how can the Church better express its love to Him, and to the brethren for His sake, than by obeying His command to preach the gospel to every creature? How, indeed, can any Christian better show his love to Christ than by seeking to be to his neighbour what Christ has become to himself?—to use a thought of Luther which may be said to epitomize the great Reformer's ethics. But what we do for our neighbour for Christ's sake is lifted above the sphere of ethics, and becomes an offering to Him from a grateful and loving heart. A distinguished Scottish churchman was once travelling in a train with a young French priest who told him that he had volunteered for missionary service on the Congo, and was on his way to see his mother for the last time. 'Why for the last time?' The answer came, 'Because the average life of a missionary on the Congo is two years and a half.' As they parted the Scot asked, 'Why are you going?,' and the young man quietly answered, 'The life I now live, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me.'

The Kingdom of God has Come

By the Reverend W. R. Hutton, M.A., B.D., Nowgong, Assam, India

Professor Matthew Black's article on 'The Kingdom of God Has Come' in the June 1952 issue of The Expository Times caused me to reread the arguments presented by the Rev. J. Y. Campbell and Dr. Dodd in Vol. xlviii. of The Expository Times and in Dr. Dodd's *The Parables of the Kingdom*. I was surprised that none of the three had made a complete study of *engidzo*. Mr. Campbell called attention to *eingkiken* in Ro 13^{12}, Ja 5^{8}, and 1 P 4^{7} as supporting his argument. Only the first two may be conceded without question. But the word needs to be studied in all its forms and not merely the perfect, and that is the purpose of this article.

For *engidzo* the latest dictionaries, including Bauer just appearing, give the meaning as older dictionaries have given it, 'draw near.' Translators sticking to, or as close as possible to, this meaning have given renderings that are hardly everyday English. In one case topography is ignored, and in three occurrences the theology is impossible. Had we not mentally read into the passages more than the English means a more accurate translation would have been demanded long ago.

Engidzo in one form or another is used according to Moulton and Geden's *Greek Concordance* forty-two times in the New Testament. Of these twenty-four are in Luke-Acts, and ten in Matthew and Mark.

At the beginning it is probably not necessary to concede that more than ten of these must be translated by some form of 'come near' or the like. They are Lk 19^{37} 21^{28} 22^{1}, Ac 7^{17}, Ro 13^{12}, Ph 2^{30}, He 10^{25}, Ja 5^{8}, Mt 21^{1}, and Mk 11^{1}. The use in the last two references is so strange that one feels there has been confusion somewhere and that the straightforward statement of Lk 19^{29} presents a correct picture.

The cases demanding a translation meaning 'to come to,' 'to reach,' 'to arrive,' 'to arrive in or at' or the like are as follows:

1. In Ac 21^{33} the police officer did not merely 'come near' as the A.V. and E.R.V. have it, but 'came up' as the Revised Standard Version, Weymouth, Twentieth Century, Moffatt, Lattey, Knox, Goodspeed, and the Confraternity versions all have.

2. Why all should not have translated *engidzo* in the same way in Ac 23^{15} is difficult to understand, but the R.S.V. clings to 'come near' and others have their translations cramped because they have not escaped completely from the 'come near' idea. Only the version of the Confraternity with 'before he gets here' and Knox 'before he reaches you' state in plain English exactly what is meant. These two translate from the Latin, but the Latin dictionary gives them no more help than the Greek dictionaries give the others. The meaning is evident.

3. Luke says in 15^{1}, 'The tax collectors and sinners were all drawing near to Jesus.' So the R.S.V., Confraternity, Twentieth Century, Weymouth, and Lattey, while Moffatt merely changes to 'approach.' Knox translates 'coming to,' which seems to me to be the way to say it in English. We go to hear Mr. Churchill or Mr. Truman, or anyone else. Only if one cannot hear well does he try to 'draw nearer,' and that sounds funny. We try to get closer or the like. Something of this idea must have been in the minds of Goodspeed and Verkuyl in translating 'crowding up.' But it seems unnecessary to read that much into *engidzo*. The folk were coming to Jesus to hear Him and that was all, but that implies *arrival*.

4. Lk 18^{40} shows exactly the same sort of situation. Jesus had asked to have the blind man brought to Him but the R.S.V. renders 'When he came near.' Surely Jesus did not begin talking until the man *reached* Him, and Goodspeed and Lattey must be correct in rendering it 'When he came up.'

5. In Lk 12^{33} Jesus says, according to the R.S.V., 'where no thief approaches'; Twentieth Century, 'come near,' and so also Knox and the Confraternity and Goodspeed, while Lattey agrees with R.S.V. Moffatt paraphrases with 'no thief can get at,' which, at any rate, means more than 'come near'; so also Verkuyl's 'where no thief reaches.' These examples show how the translators are confused and inconsistent in renderings because they are not entirely free from the meaning 'draw near' as given in the dictionaries. But it is evident that so long as a thief merely 'comes near' he does no damage. Only when he can actually arrive and lay his hands on other people's property is there any loss.

6. With this in mind read Lk 22^{47}. The R.S.V. has, 'He drew near to kiss him.' 'He drew near to kiss his sweetheart' would sound funny. When one kisses another we naturally expect him to be at the side of the person kissed. Moffatt and others have 'approached' which is ambiguous; Weymouth 'went up to' and Goodspeed with

' stepped up to ' give the meaning in plain language. Judas actually *arrived* at Jesus' side.

7. In the same way Lk 24^{15}, ' While they were talking Jesus himself drew near.' So the R.S.V. But Weymouth, Goodspeed, and the Twentieth Century with ' came up ' and Moffatt and Verkuyl with ' caught up ' are, I think, much better and more accurate. Jesus actually *arrived*, He joined them or He could not have gone on with them.

8. The meaning of arrive is just as plain in *v.* 28 of the same chapter. ' They drew near to the village ' of the R.S.V. and others seems wrong in the face of the situation. Goodspeed with ' When they reached ' and Verkuyl with ' on reaching their destination ' alone give the correct picture. Had they merely ' drawn near ' they would all have had to go farther to get to the village but they had arrived, and only then did the two disciples know that Jesus was not planning to stop in the same village.

9. With all these plain examples before us it seems to me that the translation of Lk 19^{41} which has worried all the translators can easily be made to make sense. In *v.* 37 we have *engidzontos* with the sense given in the dictionaries. The R.S.V. reads, ' As he was now drawing near, at the descent of the Mount of Olives.' The object of drawing near is not stated but the implication is that it is the place where the descent to Jerusalem begins. Then in *v.* 41 we have *eingisen* which the R.S.V. renders, ' when he drew near.' Other versions keep some form of drawing near, such as ' approach ' by Moffatt. But the unfortunate result of keeping the meaning ' draw near ' is seen in the translations by Weymouth and Goodspeed, which make Jesus come part way down the mountain before He sees Jerusalem. Others with a twice-repeated ' draw near ' without an object make one wonder why the thought is repeated.

But with the place where the descent begins understood as the object in each case we have first the approach to this place in *v.* 37 and then the actual arrival in *v.* 41, and from there the city in its glory was plainly visible. To bring this out in translation it is necessary to say, ' When he *reached* the descent of ' or something of the kind.

10. It seems to me that the recognition of this meaning of *arrival* makes it possible to remove what has always been considered a contradiction between Luke on the one side and Mark and Matthew on the other in the story of the blind man partly considered above.

Mark has in 10^{46}, R.S.V. translation, ' And they came to Jericho ; and as he was leaving Jericho with his disciples.' Mt 20^{29} omits the, ' And they came to Jericho ' of Mark and takes only ' And as they were leaving Jericho.' Luke reads, according to the R.S.V. 18^{35}, ' As he drew near to Jericho.' (Note there is no ' as ' in the Greek.) This is certainly a contradiction in English. But Luke has merely changed Mark's *erkontai* to *engidzein*, evidently meaning the same thing, namely, Jesus arrived in or at Jericho. Then he goes on to relate the cure of the blind man. He gives us no idea as to whether the cure occurred on one side or the other of Jericho. We learn from Mark and Matthew that it was after leaving Jericho. If some one points to Lk 19^{1} as proof that it must have been before, I can only say that I see no reason for taking the *kai* as indicating a succession in time. Luke knew of two things that happened at Jericho and he told them both. That is all.

11. Lk 21^{8} can be improved by taking this meaning. Jesus is warning against false Messiahs who will say, ' I am he. The time *eingiken*.' Surely, ' the time is at hand,' the usual reading given also by R.S.V. is not enough. Jesus goes on to say in *v.* 9 not to pay attention to them for ' the end will not be at once.' So the R.S.V. But if the false Messiah is merely saying, ' the time is near,' how is one to recognize him as false ? He is saying exactly what Jesus Himself says.

12. These make possible the translation of Lk 21^{20} as ' the time of her desolation has come ' of Lk 7^{12} as ' when he reached the gate of the city,' so making the cure take place in the most prominent part of the town. So also Ac 9^{3} 10^{15} and 22^{6} actual arrival at the gates. And also Lk 15^{25} as ' When the elder brother reached the house.' And of Lk 19^{29} as ' When he reached Bethphage and Bethany.' And likewise Mt 21^{34} could be translated, ' When the fruit season came.' However, in none of these eight places except perhaps the first is the point important.

13. It is different with He 7^{19}. Here if *engidzomen* does not mean to ' come to,' ' to arrive,' then the author has failed to make his point, that the Christian faith is better than the Jewish. If the Christian through Christ does not get all the way to God what is there to bridge the gap ? The fact seems to be that the emotional content of ' draw near to God ' has made the reader blind to the fact that the words do not mean what he reads into them.

This is also true for Ja 4^{8} where the plain meaning is, ' Go to God and he will come to you,' translating ' *engidzate* ' by ' go ' and ' *engisei* ' by ' come.' Arrival is necessitated in both cases.

14. Mt 26^{45} should accordingly be translated, ' The hour has arrived ' or ' come.' And that makes it agree with, ' The Son of Man is betrayed.' And one should go on in *v.* 46 to say, ' My betrayer has arrived.' Why should translators stick to, ' My betrayer is at hand ' as the R.S.V. and Knox, Lattey and the Confraternity, or ' close at hand '

as Weymouth, Twentieth Century, Moffatt, or 'coming' as Goodspeed and Verkuyl? *V.* 47 tells us that before Jesus got the words out of His mouth Judas arrived. Had these verses been dug up in papyri with no dictionaries to mislead, it is unlikely that anything but 'has come' or 'arrived' would have been suggested. So also the parallel in Mark. But the point need not be pressed, one may take his choice. *Either may be correct*, and that is worth noting.

15. It is time now to recall the fact that of the forty-two occurrences of *engidzo* in the New Testament twenty-four occur in Luke-Acts. Of these I have shown that at least eleven demand 'come,' 'come to,' 'arrive,' or the like. With only four instances in Luke-Acts, namely, Lk 19^{27} 21^{28} 22^{1} and Ac 7^{17} demanding 'be near,' 'come near,' or the like, it is more than likely that in the other nine instances Luke intended the meaning to be 'reaching' or 'arriving.'

Taking the whole New Testament we note that if my contention is correct seventeen out of forty-two occurrences demand the translation, 'come to,' 'come up to.' At least nine others may well have this meaning, and it is likely to be preferred.

Of the remaining occurrences six are the disputed, 'The Kingdom of God has come' or 'is near' in Mt 3^{2} 4^{17} 10^{7}, Mk 1^{15}, Lk $10^{9.\ 11}$. Since there are eleven occurrences in Luke that demand the meaning 'arrive,' 'come to,' or the like, and only four that certainly mean 'come near' or the like, it seems reasonable that Lk 10^{9} and ^{11} should be taken with the 'overwhelming' majority of cases and translated 'has come.' I think Professor Dodd conceded too much when he wrote, 'I take *ephthasen* at its face value, and try to make *engidzo* conform.' There seems no need to force the meaning of *engidzo*. It conforms of itself to the well-established meaning of 'has come' for *ephthasen*. So we arrive at the conclusion that Professor Dodd may well be right in translating Mk 1^{15} and all parallel passages as, 'The Kingdom of God has come.' If we concede this then we have twenty-eight out of thirty-two occurrences in the Synoptics and Acts that may reasonably be translated by some form of 'come to' or 'arrive.'

The above study makes it necessary to add to the dictionary a second meaning for *engidzo*. It clears up the supposed contradiction in the Synoptics in regard to the site of the healing of the blind and makes possible a straightforward, clear translation of what happened when Jesus came over the Mount of Olives to Jerusalem. The use of this second meaning will also make the situation much clearer in many cases, and if it does not make Dr. Dodd's translation of 'The Kingdom of God has come' certain it will at least force the arguments to be on other than lexicographical ground.

Contributions and Comments

The Last Supper

In his excellent treatise, 'Living Issues in Biblical Scholarship: The Last Supper' (The Expository Times, lxiv. 4), Professor Kilpatrick calls attention to a most important, but almost wholly neglected apocryphon, the Prayer of Aseneth (Joseph and Aseneth = *JA*). Especially, he stresses the passage of *JA* where it is said that the Jews are separated from the Gentiles by eating *ἄρτον εὐλογημένον ζωῆς* and drinking *ποτήριον εὐλογημένον ἀθανασίας* and being anointed *χρίσματι εὐλογημένῳ ἀφθαρσίας*.[1] In his Prayer, Joseph asks God that Aseneth *φαγέτω ἄρτον ζωῆς σου καὶ πινέτω ποτήριον εὐλογίας σου*.[2] Then, Michael, the archistrategos, visits Aseneth and gives her the promise that (by her conversion to Judaism) she would partake in the blessed bread, wine, and chrism.[3] Lastly, Aseneth is addressed as *μακαρία* because *ἔφαγες ἄρτον ζωῆς καὶ ποτήριον ἔπιες ἀθανασίας καὶ χρίσματι κέχρισαι ἀφθαρσίας*.[4]

[1] P. Batiffol, *Studia Patristica*, i. [Paris, 1889], p. 49, ll. 3 ff.
[2] P. 49, ll. 18 ff. [3] P. 61, ll. 2 ff. [4] P. 64, ll. 3 f.

Without any question Professor Kilpatrick is right when he points out that *JA* is a piece of Hellenistic Jewish propaganda from Egypt and that it seems to represent conversion to Judaism under the guise of initiation to a mystery.

Scholarship is extremely indebted to Professor Kilpatrick for having drawn to the light the important apocryphon which will be playing a considerable part in further investigation in the religious environment of the New Testament. I am not quite sure, however, if the sentences quoted are an immediate help for the understanding of the Last Supper. Professor Kilpatrick is inclined to assume that *JA* gives us evidence for the existence of a Jewish religious meal (not mentioned elsewhere) similar to the Last Supper; but it is difficult to imagine that such a religious rite existed without having left a trace anywhere else. Personally, I should prefer to think that *JA* is speaking of the benedictions at the beginning and at the end of the ordinary daily meal and of the anointing of the guest before the meal (Lk 7^{46}), describing all this for the purpose of propaganda by using solemn phrases borrowed from Hellenistic syncretism. (It may be that *JA*, compared to

Mk 2^{15}, Ac 16^{34}, allows the conclusion that conversion was often combined with a feast.) That the ordinary daily meal could be carried out with a certain solemnity is confirmed by *Dead Sea Scrolls: Manual of Discipline*, vi. 1–6[1] and by the description of the meals of the Essenes by Josephus (*Bell. Jud.*, ii. § 129 ff.). Cf. also *B. Ber.* 64^{a}: 'If anybody is partaking in a meal at which a scribe is present, it is as if he is partaking in the splendour of the Schekina (=God).' One might call such meals habhura-meals. There seems to be no obstacle to our comparing the ordinary meals of Jesus with His disciples to those meals, especially after the confession of St. Peter changed these common meals into proleptic messianic meals. These daily meals were continued by the disciples after the Resurrection and were combined with the words of the Last Supper. At what time this combination took place we cannot say exactly; we only know that 1 Corinthians already presupposes this combination.

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Colossians ii. 21-23. (The use of πρός)

Many suggestions have been made to render this passage intelligible. In his edition of the Epistle Lightfoot (*ad loc*) gives a number of possible translations of *v.* 23 and Moffatt (*An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, 156) refers to attempts to deal with 'the corrupt state of the text.' The only variants given by the authorities are the addition of τοῦ νόος after ταπεινοφροσύνη in *v.* 23 (G d boh Hil Ambst Pel) and the omission of καί in the same place (P^{46} B 1739 Or Hil Amb Ambst Pel). The readings common to Hilary, Ambrosiaster and Pelagius would enable them to translate: '. . . the sort of things which have the reputation of wisdom by their self-imposed service and humility of mind through harsh treatment of the body, but which are not of any real value . . .' but these readings do not, of course, justify the rendering of Hilary (as Lightfoot gives it) of the last words, namely '. . . but tending to gratify the carnal desires.' Thus Moffatt translates with some freedom, '. . . but they are of no value, they simply pamper the flesh.' It is hard to see how asceticism could pamper the flesh, and the interpretation of πρὸς πλησμονὴν τῆς σαρκός, making 'but tend to' or 'they simply' the translation of πρός is very strained, and particularly so if combined with taking the words as a clause by themselves.

The passage can be translated more naturally if we take πρός to mean 'in comparison with,' as in Ro 8^{18}, where the construction is similar, but where there corresponds to ἐν τιμῇ τινι a straightforward adjective, ἄξια, thus making the meaning of πρός perfectly clear.

Lightfoot shows that οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ τινι κτλ may be safely regarded as the oppositive clause to λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας and we may therefore translate, . . . 'but not of any value compared with actual indulgence of the flesh.' St. Paul is arguing in the spirit of Is 29^{13} that this man-made asceticism, κατὰ τὰ ἐντάλματα καὶ διδασκαλίας ἀνθρώπων, is no more service of God than living the life of the flesh. πλησμονή, as Lightfoot shows, has an evil connotation. St. Paul is therefore arguing against asceticism not because it is the enemy of πλησμονή but because it does not belong to τὰ ἄνω (3^{1}). The Apostle's positive doctrine on the life of the body follows, beginning at 3^{5}, and he appears to contemplate with equanimity normal married life ($3^{18\text{-}21}$).

This interpretation is supported if we turn back to 2^{21} and study the connotations of the verbs ἅψῃ, γεύσῃ, θίγῃς. Both ἅπτεσθαι and θιγγάνειν can refer to sexual intercourse but it is probable that only the first does so here and that μὴ θίγῃς refers to such taboos as Lv 11^{24ff}. Lightfoot goes far beyond the facts when he says (*ad loc*) 'The rabbinical passages quoted in Schöttgen show how exactly St. Paul's language reproduces, not only the spirit, but even the form, of these injunctions.' The same passages are quoted by Strack-Billerbeck but it is very doubtful whether they are more than generally relevant here by way of illustrating the rabbinic temper. It has perhaps escaped notice that the compiler of 1 Timothy may well have had in mind this passage—or the same heretics which it condemns—when he writes at 1 Ti $4^{1\text{-}3}$ of those who will apostatize in the later times under the influence of 'demons' κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν εἰς μετάλημψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Nestle has noticed that the last part of this verse may be connected with Col 2^{23} but not that κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων may well be connected with the μὴ ἅψῃ, μὴ γεύσῃ of Col 2^{21}.

We may sum up by saying that if πρός may rightly be taken in Col 2^{23} to mean 'in comparison with,' and if the compiler of 1 Timothy was following the right tradition in the interpretation of Colossians, in our passage St. Paul was condemning asceticism which had only human authority, equally with indulgence, and proceeded in subsequent passages to make clear his positive view of the true life of the body 'in the Lord.'

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[1] Ed. by M. Burrows, J. C. Trever, and W. H. Brownlee [New Haven, 1951].

A Note on Mark xi. 3: ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ χρείαν ἔχει

This statement, which was the password to be used by the disciples who secured the colt for the Lord's entry into Jerusalem, has caused difficulty to translators and commentators. It is unique in Mark and would be the only place in the Gospel where the title 'The Lord' is applied to Jesus should this be its meaning. Frederick C. Grant, commenting on the passage in *The Interpreter's Bible*, denies the historicity of the language, attributing it to 'Early Church interpretation.' [1] Vincent Taylor, in his recently published commentary on Mark examines and discards as unsatisfactory various explanations given of ὁ κύριος. He concludes that the phrase refers to the owner of the animal, being also the subject of ἀποστέλλει. He adds, 'The difficulty is that we do not know where the owner was.' [2]

Granted that the phrase means the owner of the animal, why not press the inference to its logical conclusion, *i.e.* that Jesus Himself was the owner? It is quite obvious that our Lord, without His disciples' knowledge, made all the necessary preparations for His entry into Jerusalem. Having acquired the animal (not necessarily permanently) He and its keepers agreed on this password which would identify His disciples. They came, therefore, and upon being challenged by some bystanders answered: 'Its owner is needing (it).' And so they let them go.

This interpretation requires that αὐτοῦ modify ὁ κύριος, 'the owner of it.' McNeile points out that the Syriac versions and Ephraim thus unite the words 'as though Jesus claimed to be the real master of the animal.' [3] This interpretation is adopted by the American Professor, E. A. McDowell.[4] This understanding of the phrase not only offers a reasonable explanation of the Greek as it stands, but also vindicates the historicity of the passage, alleviating the interpreter from the necessity of postulating the influence of later ecclesiastical tradition.

It should be noticed, however, that Luke, unlike Mark and Matthew, probably understands the title in its messianic sense, *i.e.* 'The Lord has need of it.' In this he is not being inconsistent since he is the only one of the Synoptics who applies the title 'The Lord' to Christ during His ministry (cf. $7^{13.18}$ $10^{1.39.40}$ 11^{39} *et passim*). Furthermore, in his narrative the two disciples are challenged, not by bystanders, but by 'the owners' of the animal (οἱ κύριοι αὐτοῦ [19^{33}]) Only by understanding this phrase in Luke as meaning 'its [former] owners' can he be made to agree with the other Synoptics, but at best this is a highly doubtful expedient.

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[1] *The Interpreter's Bible*, vii. 825.
[2] *The Gospel According to St. Mark*, 454–5.
[3] *The Gospel According to St. Matthew*, 294.
[4] *Son of Man and Suffering Servant*, 154–5.

Recent Foreign Theology

Jewish Prayer. A Swedish doctoral dissertation has as its object the offering of a contribution towards the fuller understanding of Jewish prayer as a background to the study of prayer in the New Testament. It consists of an edition of the Hebrew text of Seder R. Amram Gaon, Part I, based on the four known MSS., together with Introduction, Translation, and Notes.[1] The Seder R. Amram Gaon was prepared in the ninth century A.D. in response to a request from a Spanish congregation for guidance as to the order of prayers and benedictions for the whole year. It is the oldest known Jewish Prayer Book, but behind it lies a long stream of oral tradition of prayers, the initial words of some of which are found in the Mishnah and Talmud, and it may well have been preceded by older Prayer Books. The author notes particularly the ways in which the Synagogue service was based on that of the Temple, and the relation between the service as it stands here and the New Testament references to the synagogue worship.

Bibliography of the Writings of Ernesto Buonaiuti. A voluminous Bibliography of the works of the Italian writer Ernesto Buonaiuti has been published with a short Preface by L. Salvatorelli.[2] It contains no less than three thousand, seven hundred and sixty-six items, running from 1901 to 1948. These are arranged chronologically, and then the titles of his original publications are listed alphabetically, followed by the list of books which he reviewed. A Subject Index closes the work. The staggering number of items is matched by the extraordinary range of interest of the articles

[1] *Seder R. Amram Gaon: Part I*, by D. Hedegård [1951]. Lindstedts Universitetsbokhandel, Lund.
[2] *Bibliografia degli Scritti di Ernesto Buonaiuti*, a cura Marcella Ravà [1951]. La Nuova Italia, Florence.

and of the books reviewed, covering every side of theological work, including comparative religion, as well as modern problems, and especially those where religion and politics impinge on one another. In addition to so much original writing and reviewing, Buonaiuti found time to translate Otto's book *Das Heilige* into Italian.

The Sacraments in the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Oscar Cullmann, who holds Chairs in the University of Basel and in Paris, has published a French edition of the second part of his German work *Urchristentum und Gottesdienst*.[1] In this he examines a number of passages in the Fourth Gospel, and argues persuasively that all are concerned with the meaning of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The passages studied are those concerning John the Baptist and the Baptism of Jesus, The Marriage in Cana, The Purification of the Temple, The Meeting with Nicodemus, The Meeting with the Samaritan Woman, The Healing of the Paralytic at Bethesda, The Discussion on the Sabbath, The Feeding of the Five Thousand, The Healing of the Blind Man at Siloam, The Washing of the Disciples' Feet, The Discourses at the Last Supper, and Jn 19[34]. Dr. Cullmann holds that the Fourth Gospel is a document of the highest importance for the understanding of the place of the Cult in the Early Church, and the fact that the original work is in its second edition, and that this French edition is called for testifies to the interest it has aroused.

[1] *Les Sacrements dans l'Évangile Johannique : la Vie de Jésus et le Culte de l'Église primitive* [1951]. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris

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The Meaning of נפש מת. A dissertation comes from Finland, written by a woman, Miriam Seligson, and devoted to the study of the phrase נפש מת.[2] The greater part of this study is devoted to the wider problem of the precise meaning of the word נפש in the Old Testament, with a brief chapter on the word רוח, and it is only in the last fifth of the dissertation that we reach the phrase to which all is directed. The authoress rejects the view that נפש sometimes means *throat*, and while her boldness in challenging many of the greatest scholars of the last thirty years will be admired, it must be said that they are not likely to be so easily overthrown as she imagines. Dürr, Dhorme, Driver, and Johnson, to name but a few, require heavier artillery than is here provided for their overthrow. The thesis of the authoress is that the primary significance of נפש is *force* or *potency*, and hence that נפש מת means *the potency of a dead man*, whose death is regarded as releasing an evil spirit.

H. H. Rowley

Manchester University

[2] *The Meaning of נפש מת in the Old Testament* [1951]. Helsinki.

Entre Nous

Religious Education : Biblical Archaeology

From time to time there will appear in this column notes on archaeological discoveries which have a special interest and importance for teachers of Scripture. The first reports of such discoveries normally are inaccessible to the general reader and sometimes are overlooked by later writers. We may instance the alteration of the designations of Shalmanesers II, III, and IV to III, IV, and V. The change in the numbering was due to the discovery of a new ruler of the name, whose place was between the first and second kings of the series. The inscription on which the newly discovered name appeared was reported in a German periodical in 1909, but even in 1924 some of the contributors to Peake's *Commentary on the Bible* were using the old enumeration. Nowadays publishing difficulties are apt to cause a time-lag between the publication and the popularization of new information, and too often in Biblical studies we must use text-books which are in some degree antiquated. An attempt will be made, therefore, in this section of the magazine to bring to the notice of teachers newly published knowledge or neglected discoveries in the field of archaeology.

While the importance of illustrations from archaeology for the teaching of Scripture is generally recognized, it may be useful in this introductory article to remind ourselves of the limitations of this type of material and of the dangers of its misuse.

Wrongly used, archaeology may leave our pupils with a misleading conception of the Bible. Many welcome the results of archaeology as so much evidence of the 'truth' of Scripture. Often, indeed, the contributions of archaeology

do serve to corroborate the Biblical narrative. No one would wish to minimize this service though one must bear in mind also the perplexing problems archaeology sometimes raises. But too often the impression conveyed by those who in book and article, mostly of a popular type, rush to the defence of the Bible is that the Bible is an insecure and frail fabric in need of buttressing. When, as sometimes happens, this defence consists of inaccurate statements or enthusiastic misinterpretations of the data misgivings are bound to arise about the reliability of both the science of archaeology and the Bible.

Those defenders of the inerrancy of Scripture usually are concerned to discredit the results of Biblical Criticism, which they seem to regard as seeking to discredit the Bible. Archaeology, scientific and objective, they hold, has saved the Old Testament from the subjective and destructive hypotheses of the critic. But the antithesis is quite false. Biblical criticism is but the attempt to solve real problems inherent in the text of our Bible as it has come down to us. It seeks by analysis not to destroy but to understand; its aim is to determine the nature of the various books and the process involved in their formation.

It is true also to say that some archaeological material has to be subjected to a critical scrutiny. Inscriptions, whether on stone or clay, are turned up by the spade, and such records cannot be accepted without the careful examination given to any literary source. Thus it is well known that Oriental monarchs were not hampered by modesty when describing their conquests, and their accounts of their victories must always be controlled by what we learn from other sources or by what we judge to be probable. To take one example, a more impartial observer than Shalmaneser III would have hesitated to describe the Battle of Karkar, as he did, as a complete triumph for the Assyrian forces.

Critical judgment is called for in assessing much of the rest of the archaeological evidence, for it is often fragmentary and disjointed. The picture it presents is often incomplete and far from clear, the story it tells often uncertain and ambiguous. Those who cite it to prove the truth of the Bible are prone to overlook how large is the element of probability in inferences from archaeological evidence, just as they ignore the fallibility and limitations of the archaeologist as an interpreter.

But the chief limitation in the use of archaeology is that its evidence has no bearing on the most important and vital element in the Bible. Archaeology has nothing to say about the validity of the Biblical message; it can offer no proof of the truth of its spiritual teaching. It is here that the misuse of archaeology can be most pernicious. If the impression is given that only an historically accurate record could contain a true revelation or that if the record is true the message it contains must also be true, this is a confusion of two kinds of truth. The truth or validity of the religious teaching cannot be proved by the truth or accuracy of the Bible as an historical document, nor, for that matter, is the message in any way disproved if odd pieces of historical information in the Bible are shown to be false. It is quite misleading, therefore, to leave with our pupils any suggestion that because a Biblical story is supported by archaeological discoveries the religious value of Scripture is thereby enhanced. This, the primary value of the Bible, is independent of any such evidence. In this sphere archaeology has nothing to say.

The legitimate use of archaeology in our teaching is to help in the better understanding of the Bible. This it does by throwing light on difficult passages and by filling in the background against which we have to see the Old Testament characters play their parts. Sites are identified, so that in modern Tell ed-Duweir we see ancient Lachish. Excavations at Mari and Nuzu furnish us with information about the Patriarchal Age. The discovery of Solomon's stables and copper refineries bring vividly before us that king's commercial activities. Life and colour are added to the Biblical narrative, and the Old Testament figures are humanized and brought nearer to us. This is all gain, and the teacher will welcome every aid which leads in this way to a more imaginative and sympathetic reading of the Bible.

W. D. McHardy

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Archaeology Explains

The main object of *Archaeology Explains* (Epworth Press; 6s. net), by Mr. W. H. Boulton, is 'to direct the attention of readers to a number of instances where archaeological discoveries have thrown light upon matters referred to in the Bible which, before archaeology came to their assistance, were not properly understood or were misunderstood by Bible-readers.' In nineteen chapters occupying some eighty-four pages the author covers the whole range of Biblical times, beginning with the days of the Patriarchs and ending with the Book of Revelation. Perhaps he has been too ambitious, for very many of the topics in a book of this size can receive but cursory treatment; yet if the book had no other fault than this it might have been commended as a very readable account which touched on most of the relevant archaeological discoveries.

Among minor blemishes may be noted several printer's errors. Torczyner is misspelt (p. 70), and Caiger appears as Carger (p. 86). Ac 24^{38} (p. 88) should be 21^{38}. Most of the Hebrew and Greek transliterations are wrong; cf. pp. 39, 68, 86 f., 88 f. Tahpenes was, according to 1 K 11^{19}, the name of the queen and not of her sister whom Hadad married (p. 43). In the translation of the Siloam inscriptions (p. 61) brackets ought to be placed round the words 'the excavators were lifting up' which are not extant in the original.

Issue might be joined with the writer on certain points, such as the identification of Hammurabi with Amraphel (p. 14), but he does note that there are differences of opinion here. (The authority of Langdon and Woolley has perhaps less weight on this point than the author seems to attach to it, and the identification is now generally rejected.) The size of the book precludes a fuller and fairer discussion of, for example, the date of the Exodus, about which he admits in a note that archaeologists are not unanimous. But as the fall of Ai is mentioned, some account of the problems raised by the excavation of this site might have been expected. Diggings conducted in 1933–34 have shown that Ai, a flourishing city in the third millennium B.C., was destroyed about 2200 B.C. and lay waste until about 1200 B.C. Its destruction was complete, therefore, long before the events recorded in Jos 7 and 8. This is a difficulty that archaeology has not explained, and the fact that archaeology can raise such problems should not be silently ignored.

W. D. McHardy

A Plea for Discipline

A man who writes a book because he believes that he is right and that other people are wrong may possibly produce a book with many faults; he may caricature the views of his opponents; he may write with a certain not unpleasing belligerence; but he cannot write a book that is dull. Mr. G. H. Bantock has written an exciting book entitled *Freedom and Authority in Education* (Faber and Faber; 18s. net). The book is a plea for the rediscovery and the reintroduction of the right kind of authority in the matter of education. Mr. Bantock characterizes so-called progressive education. 'It can be said to be humanistic and evolutionary rather than apocalyptic and eschatological. . . . It is pragmatic rather than concerned with ultimate aims. . . . Hence its neglect of ends and its emphasis on method and technique.' It is subjective in the sense that the individual is the standard of what is good and what is bad.

Mr. Bantock cries out for what he calls 'astringent thinking.' He quotes an article in 'The Times Educational Supplement' as saying that freedom really depends on how we behave to one another. 'It becomes mainly a question of friendly and considerate relationship between all who constitute that varied caste engaged in the drama we call education. . . . Where there is a happy friendly spirit there, I submit, and there only, freedom reigns.' It all sounds so easy and it is not. In contrast with that he quotes D. H. Lawrence. 'The amazingly difficult and vital business of human relationship has been almost laughably under-estimated in our epoch. All this nonsense about love and unselfishness more crude and repugnant than savage fetish worship. Love is a thing to be *learned*, through centuries of patient effort. It is a difficult, complex maintenance of individual integrity throughout the incalculable processes of inter-human polarity.' That is well said. The most difficult thing in the world is often sentimentalized into a sloppy thing.

Mr. Bantock deplores the over-emphasis on youth because the characteristic of youth is that 'it can and does evade rational behaviour.' We might put it that the tendency is to be childish rather than childlike. Education, he says, should be *stabilizing* as well as *vitalizing*. He regards as slightly insane the modern plea for happiness. 'A primary headmaster said to me, "Of course I don't very much mind what the children do here, provided they are happy."' Mr. Bantock points out two wise things. First, happiness is always a by-product and always evades the deliberate seeker after it; and, second, in the last analysis it is not happy children we are aiming to produce but happy adults, which means that the child will often have to do things he does not want to do. He says, 'I have encountered an educationist who has advised students not to mark children's essays unless invited by the children to do so. Not so long ago an article appeared by a former inspector, in which, on the subject of an early writing lesson, she asserted that there must be no question whatsoever of "Try harder."' Mr. Bantock insists that without the prior submission to authority real freedom can never be reached or enjoyed. He would agree that only in the highest service do we find our perfect freedom.

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